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ABSTRACT 
 
This research was aimed at exploring how taxi violence could be policed effectively within 
Stanger area. To achieve the objectives of this study the researcher interrogated the strategies that 
the police use in dealing with taxi violence as well as the impact and the challenges that are faced 
by police officials regarding this phenomenon. The researcher adopted a qualitative research 
approach in order to increase her understanding of the knowledge, attitudes, perceptions and 
beliefs related to taxi violence within Stanger area. The non-probability purposive sample 
method was used to select the research participants and the focus was on the research 
participants’ experience and knowledge of the subject matter. The researcher also used semi-
structured interviews in order to resolve specific questions. The findings were that most of the 
taxi violence remained unresolved within Stanger area because witnesses were afraid to come 
forward with information regardless of the anonymous hotline that was created to encourage the 
reporting of this violence. Consequently, because of a shortage of manpower, resources, 
uncooperative witnesses and knowledge of matters concerning taxi permits the police and other 
law enforcement agencies in the area are mainly reactive in attending to taxi violence crimes. The 
lack of proactivity hampers the success of the initiatives that they (police) put in place to address 
taxi violence in Stanger. 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL ORIENTATION 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to Sekhonyane & Duguard (2004:15), “the taxi industry is a primary medium of 
transport among Africans and the so called coloured people in South Africa”. This industry 
was previously regulated; however, after 1987 it was deregulated leading to an influx of 
new minibus taxi operators who were keen to render their services for profit at any and all 
costs. Today, this industry is a multibillion rand industry that ferries over 60% of South 
Africa’s commuters. The industry is highly competitive and has lucrative routes. In an 
effort to manage the industry, taxi owners formed associations that were based primarily on 
regions and to a lesser extent routes.  Over time, these associations grew very strong and 
strongly defended their routes. 
 
Taxi violence is a difficult concept to explain, simply because there are no specific 
elements that one can use to classify or separate it from any other violence, except the fact 
that taxi owners are involved. Since the dissolution of specialized units in the South African 
Police Service (SAPS), which included Taxi Violence Units, the policing of taxi violence is 
done by conventional policing and investigative methods (Booysen, 2009:2). Therefore, 
there is no division within the police service that is focused specifically on profiling taxi 
violence offenders or victims. Taxi violence is unique in nature as it occurs in different 
forms. As a result there are multiple types of crime that can be committed in relation to taxi 
violence such as common assault or assault with the intent to cause grievous bodily harm, 
arson, use of illegal firearms and robbery (Sekhonyane & Duguard, 2004:15 and Barret, 
2003:9). 
 
Section 205 of the South African Constitutional Act (108 of 1996) provides for the 
establishment of a law enforcement agency in the country. The law enforcement function of 
the country is primarily the responsibility of the South African Police Service. The key 
functions of the police service are outlined in Section 205 (3) of the Constitutional Act 108 
of 1996 as follows:  
• to prevent criminal activities within the society;   
• to ensure that every person and his or her property is protected;  
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• to make sure criminal activities are effectively investigated; and also 
• to ensure that every person is treated fairly. 
 
The police service achieves its objectives primarily through the delegation of these 
responsibilities to police stations (South African Police Act, No. 68 of 1995 section 11-15). 
The Stanger police station is one of the 1116 police stations managed by the South African 
Police service (SAPS) and has a responsibility to monitor any type of crime and violence 
that erupts (South African Police Act, No. 68 of 1995 section 13), including taxi violence. 
 
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
A taxi refers to a licensed minibus vehicle that is commonly used to transport multiple 
passengers along fixed routes in return for payment or a fare (Oxford South African 
Concise Dictionary, 2006:1216 and Oxford Dictionary of English, 2005:1808). Violence is 
then defined as “a behavior involving physical force intended to hurt, damage or kill” 
(Oxford South African Concise Dictionary, 2006:1330 and Oxford Dictionary of English, 
2005:1968). In other countries such as the United States of America a taxi is called a 
taxicab or a cab which is the type of vehicle for hire with a driver used by single passenger 
or more for a non-shared ride (Taxicab, 2008). Mostly in European countries the common 
transport that is used is a cab, as compared to South Africa, which has about three kinds of 
taxi with 16 to 22 seaters and metered cabs  
Taxi violence is the violence that occurs within the taxi industry. It is rooted in the 
competition and the usage of routes. The perpetrators of the violence are different 
associations operating on specific routes in a defined geographic location, locally, 
provincially and nationally. Taxi violence is a sporadic phenomenon that could happen at 
any place where there are taxis. Violence can erupt at any point on the route where taxis 
might be passing or taxi operators might be. Therefore, it is important to investigate how 
this revolving and boundless crime could be policed. The effectiveness of conventional 
policing in dealing with taxi violence deserves attention, with the intention of improving 
taxi violence policing. It is important to state that reactive policing to taxi violence appears 
not to be the best form of policing because it comes to effect after the violence has occurred 
and people have been injured or lost their lives. 
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1.3 . THE AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
 
De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport (2005:104) compare a research aim with a dream 
and view the objectives as steps that one has to take in order to attain the dream. In this 
regard the research aim of this study is to explore how taxi violence can be policed 
effectively within Stanger area. 
 
The objectives of this study are:  
• To explore the strategies that the police use in policing taxi violence in Stanger; 
• To investigate the root causes of taxi violence in Stanger; 
• To describe the nature of taxi violence in Stanger; 
• To investigate the impacts of taxi violence in Stanger; 
• To investigate the challenges facing the police when they are dealing with taxi violence in 
Stanger; and 
• To understand the nature of the relationship between the police (saps), traffic police and 
municipal police involved in dealing with taxi violence in Stanger. 
• To propose a strategy that can be used to address the problem of taxi violence in Stanger. 
 
1.4. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
A research question is a formal question that a study is designed to answer. It states clearly 
what the study will investigate or attempt to prove (Marion, 2004). According to Punch 
(2006:15), research questions are the questions the researcher is trying to answer. Pitts and 
Smith (2007:18) state that there are two factors that should be taken into account when 
talking of research questions. These factors are specificity and feasibility of the research 
question. The nature of specificity is such that the question is rather narrowly defined in 
such a way as to make clear the boundaries of the enquiry. Feasibility of a research question 
can be thought of as ‘do-ability’ – just how practical is the attempt to answer the research 
question given the resources that are available, the chosen mode of data collection, the 
sample size required and the characteristics of the community of interest?  
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The main research question of this study is: how do the police deal with taxi violence 
within Stanger area?  
 
To answer the main question the following sub-questions will be asked in order to support 
the main question: 
• What strategies do the police use in policing taxi violence in Stanger? 
• What are the root causes of taxi violence in Stanger? 
• What is the nature of taxi violence in Stanger? 
• What are the impacts of taxi violence on Stanger? 
• What are the challenges facing the police when they are dealing with taxi violence in 
Stanger? 
• What is the nature of the relationship between police (saps), traffic police and municipal 
police involved in dealing with taxi violence in Stanger? 
 
1.5 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY 
 
The study will contribute to the whole body of knowledge of understanding taxi violence, 
in order for the general public to benefit from this study and academics interested in the 
field. The researcher will ensure that the copies of this work are given to academic libraries 
and community libraries. The researcher will ensure that a copy of this work is broadly 
circulated in the entire body of the national security cluster. Most importantly, this study 
will assist the policy makers within law enforcement such as the SAPS to come up with 
new ways of policing taxi violence in Stanger and in the country as a whole. The study 
might be used as a benchmark to those engulfed by taxi violence. 
 
1.6 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
 1.6.1 Policing: Policing is the controlling and maintenance of law and order in an area by 
police officers (Oxford South African Concise Dictionary, 2006:911). In this case study 
policing is the method that is used to prevent crime from taking place.  
 1.6.2 Proactive policing: Acting in advance to deal with an expected difficulty or tending 
to initiate change rather than reacting to events (Oxford Advance Learners Dictionary, 
2006:1156; and Oxford South African Concise Dictionary, 2006:938).  Putting control 
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measures in place to the situation which might be caused by something to happen, rather 
than waiting to respond to it after it happens or by preparing for possible future events. 
Proactive policing: Is a plan to prevent crime before it takes place by showing police 
presence, engage on community issues and addresses the concerns of the people in a setting 
every day to become aware of smaller incidents that could lead to criminal activity 
(Operational definition).  
 1.6.3 Reactive policing: React to situations that have already happened rather than making 
things happen, showing a reaction or response (Macmillan English Dictionary for Advance 
Learners, 2002:173 and Oxford Advance Learners Dictionary, 2005:1207). Reactive 
policing: Is the reaction by the police after an act had occurred or crime has been 
committed, a way of responding to community needs for law enforcement rather than 
anticipating. The community contacts the police with a request and police respond to such 
request (Operational definition). 
 1.6.4 Taxi: A taxi is a car with a driver that you pay to take you somewhere (Oxford 
Advance Learners Dictionary, 2006:1516 & 1642; and Oxford South African Concise 
Dictionary, 2006:1216 & 1330). Taxi: is a vehicle that is licensed to transport passengers 
operating on pre-set routes typified multiple stops and multiple independent passengers; 
and the passengers pay in return of such services (Operational definition).  
 1.6.5 Violence: Violence is behaviour, action or words that are intended to hurt or kill 
(Oxford Advance Learners Dictionary, 2006:1516 & 1642; and Oxford South African 
Concise Dictionary, 2006:1216 & 1330). Violence: Is a physical force usually affecting or 
intended to effect injury, it can be against an individual, group of people or destruction 
(Operational definition). 
 1.6.6 Taxi violence:  it can be deduced from the above definitions that taxi violence is a 
form of violence that involves a set of sporadic acts of violence that emanate from the 
dynamics of industry-specific competition arising from the tension, on the one hand, 
between taxi owners over lucrative routes and, on the other, arising from the volatile space 
defined by policy over- regulation and deregulation (Operational definition).    
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1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
Research methodology is a process of “answering unanswered questions” (Goddard and 
Melville, 2001: 1). For this study this process would involve following the selected research 
methods to collect data that will assist the researcher in answering the specified research 
questions under the study. 
 
1.7.1 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
In this study the researcher will follow qualitative research approach because it will allow her to 
conduct in-depth interviews with the research participants and also give her an opportunity to 
gather information from the horse’ mouth- meaning from the police that have worked with cases 
of taxi violence and the taxi association members who directly experience these issues on regular 
basis. Unlike quantitative studies which aim to generalise the research results, in this study the 
research will not be able to generalise the findings of this study but rather give detailed 
information of the phenomenon at hand. The researcher have also noted the limitations of using 
qualitative approach as follows: it is costly as it requires the researcher to visit the research 
participants and create a rapport with the participants (Walker, 2001).  
 
1.7.2 RESEARCH POPULATION  
 
Bless and Higson-Smith (1995:87) state that: “A population is a set of elements that the 
research focuses upon and to which the results obtained by testing the sample should be 
generalized”. The target population in this study will selected by identifying the individuals 
from the different stakeholder groups on the basis of the knowledge and experience of the 
subject matter in the population of Stanger where the study will be conducted. These 
stakeholders are: the police, the traffic department and the taxi association. The target 
population in this study includes the following people: the commander of crime prevention, 
crime intelligence (from Stanger police station and provincial office); the chairperson of 
ILembe region of the South African National Taxi Association Corporation (SANTACO), 
members of the Public Enforcement Unit (PTEU). The sample group was then chosen from 
the identified targeted population. 
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1.7.3 SAMPLING  
Sampling refers to “the process of selecting the sample from a population in order to 
obtain information regarding a phenomenon in a way that represents the population of 
interest and to allow for an accurate generalization of results” (Bless and Higson-Smith, 
2000:83). The study used non-probability, purposive sampling to select a sample of 
participants.  According to Burns and Grove (2001:804), non-probability sampling means 
that: “not every element of the population has an opportunity of being selected in the 
sample. Purposive sampling is sometimes also called judgmental or theoretical sampling” 
(Brink & Wood, 1998:221; Bless & Higson-Smith, 1995:95; and Bless & Higson-Smith, 
2000:92). Leedy and Ormrod (2010:212) indicate that: “people or units are chosen as the 
name implies for a particular purpose or reason”. The study used purposive sampling to 
allow the researcher to select the sample based on knowledge of the phenomenon being 
studied. The researcher purposively chose participants who are knowledgeable of and 
experienced in taxi violence. In this study each member of the population did not have an 
equal chance of being selected because a purposive sample is a non-probability sample and 
therefore no generalisations were made.  
 
Based on the judgment of the phenomenon of taxi violence in Stanger the researcher selected 
and interviewed a total number of 14 research participants: 
 
• Detective service: The unit commander and three investigators from Stanger police station 
who had been investigating taxi-violence-related crimes and had relevant knowledge of 
how the police deal with taxi violence in Stanger area. 
• South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO): The chairperson of ILembe regional 
office who had been operating in the taxi industry for a period of more than 20 years. Much 
taxi violence occurred in the industry prior to and during the time of his leadership. He 
understood the dynamics of taxi violence and assisted in ways of policing taxi violence. 
• Crime prevention: Crime-prevention commander and with two members from Stanger 
police station. The commanders police the area in an attempt to reduce and deter crime and 
criminals.  
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• Cluster crime prevention: The senior member and two members from cluster office 
(support) were interviewed. Cluster office gathers the information and gives support to 
stations which falls under their jurisdiction. The members that were interviewed have an 
experience in taxi violence.  
• Authority board: The senior manager of the authority board, who adjudicated the 
operating licenses and gave the permits to the operators of the authorised association to use 
the routes they use.  
• Public transport enforcement services: Three members who enforce laws in public 
transport. This unit was specifically established to combat taxi violence and has the 
responsibility for checking if taxis are using the authorised routes and if the vehicles used 
are roadworthy.  
 
1.7.4 DATA COLLECTION 
 
There are two forms of data in research; these are primary and secondary data. Primary data 
refers to raw data that the researcher obtains directly from the research participants while 
secondary data is obtained from already available sources such as documents (Bless & 
Higson-Smith, 1995:99). In this study the researcher used both primary and secondary data. 
Burns and Grove (1997:393), define data collection as: “the process of selecting subjects 
and gathering data from subjects”. In this study the researcher used interviews to collect 
primary data and the findings from the literature review as secondary data. One on one 
interviews were conducted with participants. 
 
1.7.4.1 Interviews 
Gray (2004:214) mentions that, “the reasons for conducting an interview when there is a 
need to obtain highly personalized data; or opportunity to probe participant’ responses in 
order to gain a clear understanding of their thoughts, experience and attitudes”. Interviews 
always provide a good return of useful information. According to Leedy and Ormrod 
(2010:148), “interviews can yield a great deal of useful information”. There are three types 
of interviews – structured, unstructured and semi-structured interviews. “Structured 
interview are interviews in which all participants are asked the same questions with the 
same wording in same way” (Corbetta, 2003:269). Bryman 2001:107 explains: “A 
structured interview is an administration of questionnaires by an interviewer. The aim is 
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for all interviewees to be given exactly the same content of questioning and the goal of this 
style of interview is to ensure that interviewees’ replies can be aggregated. Semi-structured 
interviews are non- standardized and are frequently used in qualitative research methods”. 
However, “the researcher has a list of key themes, issues and questions to be covered but 
the order of questions can be changed depending on the direction of the interview” (David 
& Stanton, 2004:87). An interview guide/schedule is also used and additional questions 
asked. An unstructured interview is non-directed and follows a flexible method; it is more 
casual and there is no need to follow a detailed interview guide. Interviewees are 
encouraged to speak openly, frankly and give as much detail as possible. 
 
The researcher used semi-structured interviews because the researcher wanted to answer 
specific questions. “There are specific questions asked and the researcher wanted 
participants’ views to solve the problem” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:188). , “Semi-structured 
interviews will assist the interviewer to understand their feelings and attitudes more 
clearly, and seek additional information wherever necessary and make information 
meaningful to the researcher” (Bless & Higson-Smith, 1995:10). The researcher conducted 
individual interviews and interviewed one participant at a time. 
 
The advantage of semi-structured interviews is that they allow more detailed questions to 
be asked and the participant’s own words to be recorded. “The ambiguities are clarified 
and follow up questions are asked for incomplete answers and they allow for the 
establishment of a list of possible answers or solutions” (Bless, Higson-Smith & Kagee, 
2006:119; Curtis & Curtis 2011:33). Precise wording is tailored to the participant and the 
precise meaning of questions is clarified. In addition, “volumes of data obtained through 
interviewing and a better response rate can be achieved” (Marshall & Rossman, 
1999:109). 
 
There could, however, be a recall bias particularly as a result of the passage of time or when 
the matter under investigation was a sensitive one. “Participants might not necessarily 
volunteer critical information. Interviews can sometimes be very time consuming and 
costly” (Bless, Higson-Smith & Kagee, 2006:137). “The interviewees may also be 
unwilling or may be uncomfortable sharing certain information which the interviewer 
hopes to explore” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999:109). According to Curtis and Curtis 
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(2011:33), “sometimes it can be challenging to keep the interview on track as the 
participant may want to tell you things that are not really relevant”.   
 
The questions were asked in order to obtain answers to the research questions. Only one 
interview schedule was used for all research participants. All questions were pre-tested 
before the final sets of questions were determined and the interviews took place. A 
standardised schedule of questions customised in line with the core functions of the 
stakeholder group, however, was developed with the central theme of exploring the causes 
of and solutions to violence in Stanger. The researcher piloted the interview schedule for 
the pre-testing of the research instrument. In so doing, she was helped to identify the quality 
of the set questions and to see if the participants would be able to understand them or not 
(Turner, 2010:757).  
 
The researcher recorded the interviews by writing short-hand notes, and using a tape 
recorder from which the information was later transcribed into written text. According to 
Leedy & Ormrod (2010:21) that makes: “the analysis of the interviews easier and more 
effective”. 
 
1.7.4.2 Review of related literature  
Circulars held by the South African Police Service and relating to taxi violence were used 
by the researcher. According to Marshall and Rossman (1999:116), “the review documents 
are an unobtrusive method, rich in portraying the values and beliefs of participants in the 
setting”. The researcher gathered and analysed documents and records that, on the strength 
of relevance, were directly linked to the researcher’s questions in the conceptual framework 
of the study. A review of documents relevant to this study was carried out in order that gaps 
could be identified in knowledge and weaknesses of previous studies identified. Documents 
were drawn from the existing grey literature – “various types of documents produced by 
government, academic institutions, business and industries that is available on the public 
domain” (Kiteley & Stogdon 2014:7). For this study the researcher focused on library 
books and academic journal articles with a view to marking out specific trends and patterns 
of taxi violence and their triggers. 
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1.7.5 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 
 
The researcher adopted a qualitative data analysis since it would help to identify repeat 
patterns or themes in the data (Bless & Higson-Smith, 1995:105). Marshall and Rossman 
(1995:111) state that: “qualitative data analysis is a search for general statements about 
relationships among categories of data that build grounded theory”. It usually involves, 
“reducing accumulated data into a manageable size, developing summaries, looking for 
patterns and giving meaning to the emerging themes” (Cooper & Shrindler, 2003:87). 
 
The researcher followed a spiral method of qualitative data analysis. In achieving this, the 
researcher analysed the data several times, taking the following steps into account: 
• The researcher started by organising the large data from transcripts;  
• The researcher read through the transcripts several times to understand them and to identify 
possible themes and meanings and;  
• The researcher classified the similar themes under the same categories; and 
• Finally the researcher interpreted and discussed the data for readers to make sense of it. 
(Creswell, 1998 in Leedy & Ormrod, 2005:150). 
 
1.7.6 RELIABILITY 
 
Reliability relates to the methods of data collection and the concern that they should be 
consistent and not distort the findings. Generally, reliability entails an evaluation of the 
methods and techniques used to collect the data. “It refers to the ability of the research 
process to provide results that do not vary from occasion to occasion and that do not vary 
according to the particular persons undertaking the research” (Denscombe, 2002:100). 
Joppe, in Golafshani, (2003:598) defines reliability as, “the extent to which results are 
consistent over time”. To ensure that the findings of this study are reliable the researcher 
obtained the detailed information of the research participants and their level of experience 
as well as the limitations encountered in this study. This was done in order to ensure that if 
anyone would like to repeat this study should be aware of the profile of the participants and 
the limitations that formed part of the final product of this research study.  
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1.7.7 VALIDITY 
 
Validity of “measuring instrument as the property of a measure that allows the researcher 
to say that the instrument measures what he says it measures” (Joppe, in Golafshani, 
2003:598). In order to ensure the validity of the findings of this study the researcher used 
the following tools: 
 
• Tape recordings 
Keep tape recordings of the interview sessions with the research participants for future 
references on the accuracy of the data.  
 
• Peer debriefing 
Peer debriefing requires the researcher to work together with one or several colleagues who 
hold impartial views on the study. The impartial peers examined the researcher’s 
transcripts, final report and general methodology. Afterwards, “feedback is provided to 
enhance credibility and ensure validity” (Guba & Lincoln, 1985:308). “The researcher 
located a person who reviewed and asked questions about the qualitative study so that the 
account will resonate with people other than the researcher” (Creswell, 2014:202). This 
strategy involved an interpretation beyond the researcher and invested in another person, 
which adds validity to an account. 
 
• Member checking 
According to Guba & Lincoln (1985:103), member checking “is when data, analytic 
categories, interpretations and conclusions are tested with members of those groups from 
whom the data were originally obtained”. In determining the accuracy of the qualitative 
findings the researcher took the final report back to participants in order to determine the 
accuracy of the qualitative findings (Creswell, 2014:201) and provided the participants with 
an opportunity to comment on the study. The researcher also verified the correctness of the 
data with the research participants before ending the interview sessions. 
 
• Clarify bias 
The researcher remained neutral whilst working on the research and the self-reflection 
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created an open and honest narrative that resonated well with readers. According to 
Creswell (2014:202), clarifying bias indicates that, “a good qualitative researcher contains 
comments by the researchers about how their interpretation of the findings is shaped by 
their background such as gender, culture, history, work experience and socioeconomic 
origin”. The researcher used a co-coder to give a second opinion on the data and therefore 
the commonalities found confirmed that the data was well interpreted.” 
 
1.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
In conducting research ethical issues are the main concern, “the rights of the participants 
must be respected” (Bless & Higson-Smith, 1995:102). The researcher ensured that the 
participants were observed, protected and respected (Polit & Hungler, 1999:134). Ethical 
principles must apply to the research process, which ensures that the humanistic and moral 
reasons are upheld. “Ethics in research also enhances the credibility and trustworthiness of 
data” (Burns & Grove, 2001:196). The ethical considerations for this study are outlined 
below: 
 
1.8.1  Informed consent 
 
“The person must voluntarily agree to participate in the study and can refuse to divulge 
certain information” (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000:100). The participants must be fully 
informed and understand the research project in which they are being asked to participate 
in. The researcher explains the purpose of the study before getting consent from the 
participants. Written/verbal consent was therefore obtained from participants. This was 
done to “ensure that there is no relationship of mistrust between the researcher and the 
research participants” (Burns & Grove, 2001:196).    
 
1.8.2  Right of privacy 
 
“Social research often invades a person’s privacy” (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000:100); the 
consent for right to privacy must be obtained. “Privacy is a right an individual has to 
determine the time, extent and general circumstances under which personal information is 
shared or withheld from others” (Burns & Grove, 2001:196). Privacy was maintained 
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throughout the study. The researcher ensured that participants were treated equally 
regardless of their socio-economic status, whether illiterate or learned. 
 
1.8.3  Right to confidentiality 
 
“Confidentiality is related to the researcher’s management of private information shared 
by the participants” (Burns & Grove, 2001:196), “the participants will be assured that the 
information given will be treated with confidentiality” (Burns & Grove, 2001:196). The 
researcher assured that data would only be used for the stated purpose of the research and 
that no other person would have access to interview data. The researcher ensured that the 
interview schedule and data collected was kept in a safe place. 
 
1.8.4  Anonymity 
 
Participants were willing to divulge private information on condition that their names were 
not mentioned (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000:100). Brink (2003:42) indicates that, 
“anonymity relates to keeping the participants nameless in relation to their participation in 
the study”.  The researcher respected the participants’ right to remain anonymous by 
concealing the identities of participants in all documents. 
 
1.8.5 Permission to conduct the study 
 
The researcher obtained permission from the South African Police Service to ensure that 
the research did not infringe on the South African Police Service standards. The researcher 
also obtained approval from the University of South Africa to proceed with the research. 
 
1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY   
 
The National Office of SAPS gave authority to conduct interviews with SAPS members 
including crime intelligence but the provincial office of SAPS refused permission for them 
to be interviewed. Analysis of case dockets was refused by management of SAPS. 
Members of both Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations agreed to be interviewed but on 
the day in question some of them refused the interview. Other members of the association 
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that were interviewed later called the researcher and requested that notes that were taken 
during the interview would be destroyed. Interviews with the people from the taxi industry 
were not recorded because they requested not to be recorded.  
 
1.10  CHAPTERS LAYOUT 
 
Chapters of this dissertation are arranged as follows: 
 
• Chapter 2: History of taxi violence in South Africa.  
This chapter discusses the origin of the taxi industry, the role played by the government in 
regulating and deregulating the functioning of the industry as well as the transformation of 
the taxi industry. 
• Chapter 3: The nature of taxi violence in South Africa. 
This chapter then focuses on the type and magnitude of taxi violence and the major causes 
of this violence.  The influence of police and politics in this industry is also discussed.   
 
• Chapter 4: Presentation of research findings 
In this chapter the researcher presents the research findings and also discusses them. 
 
• Chapter 5: Recommendations and conclusions.  
This chapter makes recommendations and conclusions about this study 
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CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORY OF TAXI VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2. 1. INTRODUCTION 
The origins of the taxi industry in South Africa can be traced back into the early 1930s and it has 
been a major break-through in public transportation especially among the blacks majority. The 
Nationalist government was uninterested in this mode of public transport as evidenced by the 
fact that there was no support in terms of employment or subsidies (Fourie 2003:32; Khosa, 
1991:234). 
The taxi industry in South Africa has shifted political and socio-economic conditions and has 
become the dominant mode of public transport in the country, which contributes positively in the 
economy and alleviates poverty by opening employment opportunities. Taxi violence is a 
problem that has not yet been completely eradicated as it happens in different forms. The 
deregulation and reregulation by the government of the taxi industry has created problems 
(Fourie, 2003:32). This confusion in government policies, government officials and police being 
owners of the taxis in the industry has a negative impact on decision making (Barret, 2003:8). In 
this chapter the background to taxi violence is given in the context of the origins of the taxi 
industry in South Africa as well as the subsequent uneven regulation of the industry. The 
regulation of the taxi industry has been presented in a chronological order that reflects the 
different periods of regulation and the challenges and successes during those periods.  
 
2.2 THE ORIGIN OF THE TAXI INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
According to Khosa (1991:234), the “origin of the taxi industry can be traced back to the horse-
drawn vehicles that were used for hire (cabs), which emerged in the late 1800s”. Although the 
government favoured trains as the means of transporting black workers in the 1920s, several 
independent bus operators and taxi services have emerged and flourished as a profitable 
alternative means. The history of the taxi industry is closely linked to the oppressive policies of 
the apartheid past. Urban African people were increasingly relocated forcefully to reside in areas 
far from the commercial and industrial centres of all South Africa’s cities in the early 1960s. The 
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policies of apartheid catered for relocations and they were designed to keep racially defined 
groups separate (Barret, 2003:6). The by-product of this was ever increasing transport costs for 
black Africans when they commuted to work and at times they happened to be relocated to 
places with poor public transport in the form of government buses and trains. The second factor 
was that public buses and trains operated at peak times only and routes became less and less 
flexible (Barret, 2003:6). 
Another feature of apartheid and institutionalised racism that was introduced in the early 1960s 
was that blacks and particularly Africans had limited legal access to business opportunities. It 
was virtually impossible for Africans to acquire a permit to operate a taxi. According to Barret 
(2003:6), those who managed to operate in the taxi industry were allowed only to use sedan cars 
as the only vehicles recognised for taxi purposes. These taxis did not fulfil the required needs of 
the increasing African market as they catered for a very small segment of the population. By this 
time public transport was dominated by the state-owned rail sector and the subsidised bus 
industry (Barret, 2003:6). 
Initially, the state protected the existing public transport systems and prevented entrepreneurs 
from operating taxis by refusing to issue road carrier permits to them. In terms of section 2(3) of 
the Road Transportation Act 74 of 1977 any vehicle carrying ten passengers or more for reward 
was defined as a bus and subjected to the conditions that were regulating buses such as leaving 
one seat of a ten-seater empty. Despite this, it was still impossible to acquire permits, as the 
National Transport Commission (NTC) and the ten Local Road Transport Boards (LRTB) that 
were responsible for issuing permits were hostile (Khosa, 1995:171). Emerging taxi 
entrepreneurs mainly created competition for them. The demand for minibus taxi transport was 
growing and drivers operated illegally without permits,  were subsequently subjected to fines, 
and often to forfeiture of their vehicles, with enforcement coming largely from the then South 
African Railways Police Force (SARPF) (Barret, 2003:6). 
The other challenge was that the local authorities that were exercising control over the growth of 
the industry by granting them permission to use the taxi ranks was stifling the growth of this 
industry. This was because the authority to grant kombi taxis permission to park in designated 
areas for loading and off-loading purposes in the cities was to be permitted by the traffic 
department of the various local authorities. Refusal to grant such permission hamstrung the 
growth of this industry by making the operation of most taxis illegal and subjecting its operators 
to prosecutions and the confiscation of their vehicles. In addition, Barret (2003:6) states that “the 
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government was becoming increasingly ambivalent on how to react to the growing kombi taxi 
industry”. Despite all these challenges the kombi taxis defied all the odds and became the 
commonly used form of public transport in black communities. Prior to the deregulation of the 
taxi industry the black taxi drivers had to defy apartheid laws and strict regulations that were 
prejudicial and imposed on them. The taxi industry increased quickly in the wake of the 
apartheid government’s policy of economic deregulation initiated in 1987 (Sekhonyane & 
Dugard (2004:14). 
According to Khosa (1991:232), the taxi industry was one of the most extraordinary socio-
economic phenomena in South Africa. It advocated for free market enterprise and its growth was 
a silent revolution transforming South Africa into one of the most integrated economies and as 
the fruit for popular non-racial capitalism, albeit that its patrons were predominantly black 
workers at this stage. The taxi industry has been hailed by some analysts as one of the success 
stories of black entrepreneurship (Khosa, 1991:232). 
 
2.3 THE REGULATION OF THE TAXI INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The regulation of the taxi industry has been dealt with in six distinct categories that symbolise 
the evolution of the taxi industry reflecting how the competition and the fight over the use of 
routes resulted in the injury and death of both the taxi operators and commuters. Various 
attempts have been made to restructure and formalise this industry for the benefit of the 
commuters, as well as the profitability and sustainability of the taxi industry in South Africa. 
What is very clear from the evolution of the taxi industry is that taxi operation moves in tandem 
with settlement of the communities in different areas, most of which happen to be undeveloped 
areas that do not have formal public transport such as buses and trains. 
 
2.3.1  The period between 1920 to 1977 
The Le Roux Commission of 1929 dealt with the state of public transport in South Africa at a 
time when the transportation system was in disarray because of the competition that was 
unrestricted and uncontrolled before 1930 (Khosa, 1991:234). The Le Roux Commission 
indicated that even though the independent bus operators and taxi services emerged and 
flourished the government was strongly in favour of the trains as the means of transportation for 
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black workers (Khosa, 1995:171). In addressing some of the shortfalls that were identified by the 
Le Roux Commission, the government passed the Motor Carrier Transport Act No 39 of 1930 
that introduced enormous transport regulations that stifled competition and created transport 
monopolies (Khosa, 1991:234). 
The Motor Carrier Transport Act protected the railways from the competition from other road 
carriers; empowered the Local Road Transportation Boards to have quotas in issuing the 
certificates in those areas where there were no rails. The independent operators were hard-hit by 
this legislation because it forbade the transportation of goods or passengers without a certificate 
to do so; an as indicated previously the acquiring of such permit was nearly impossible 
(Sekhonyane & Dugard, 2004:14). According to Khosa (1991:234), the restriction was not only 
that black taxis were authorised to carry four passengers only, but they were also constantly 
harassed by traffic officials who use to confiscate their vehicles for petty offences. 
Khosa (1991:235) states that it was difficult for black people to obtain a taxi permit, because 
they were subjected to a complex network of legal restriction and this resulted in most taxis 
operating illegally without the required permit. Some of the requirements were that the 
applicants had to have a formal employment record, had lived in the area for a number of years 
and were in possession of a Daily Labourers’ Permit (Khosa, 1991:235). If it was found that the 
applicants were in urban areas illegally their applications for permits were rejected. When one 
considers the limited number of black people who qualified to be in the urban areas legally 
during the Bantustan period, it is understandable why the number of black people who qualified 
to run the taxi business was so low. 
 
2.3.2  The period between 1977 to 1987 
The Breda Commission of Enquiry was established to look into transport deregulation in 1977 by 
the government. The fear remained that continued intervention in the transport sector would 
result in deep politicization and sustained boycotts.  
The Commission indicated that the country has reached the stage where a freer competition in 
transportation was impossible. It further revealed that a shift in the economic policy was leading 
to generalized deregulation, commercialization and privatization of the economic system. The 
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black taxi industry witnessed a significant growth in late 1970s and by 1982 more than 90% of 
black taxis were minibuses. 
Table 1 below indicates the number of permits that were applied for and granted in Johannesburg 
from 1984 to 1990. 
 
Table 1: Permits applied for between 1984 and 1990 
Year  Application Sedan licences Kombi licences Total licences 
1984/85 29,788 389 12 401 
1985/86 33,733 379 307 689 
1986/87 45,630  3,600  
 
750  4,350 
1987/88 57,552 89 6,898 6,987 
1988/89 48,521 291 4,602 4,893 
1989/90 56,248 2,070 13,090 15,160 
(Source: Khosa, 1991:236) 
Taxi drivers began using larger minibuses that could carry up to 15 passengers from the early 
1980s. These taxis were illegal until formal deregulation in 1987; taxis were the most popular 
transport for black commuters for the following advantages as compared to other public transport 
(Sekhonyane & Dugard, 2004:14):  
• They working until late at night; 
• They serviced all the areas including the routes where public transport was inaccessible;  
• They were convenient to users because it picked up and dropped them off at any place;  
• Their rates were reasonable; and  
• They could ferry more people on a single trip than a private vehicle which carry the 
capacity of on more than five people. 
The bus boycotts that took place in 1980 suggested that there was a need for the alternative 
transport and this worked in favour of deregulation of the transportation system. Buses and trains 
were frequently attacked by youth for political reasons that forced the commuters to prefer to use 
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taxis (Sekhonyane & Dugard, 2004:14).  Such a chain of events led to the disinvestment from 
foreign investors and the end result was retrenchment in the public transport industry. The taxi 
industry benefited from bus boycotts by becoming one of few enterprises that accommodated 
retrenched workers as well as aspiring businessmen. 
The Welgemoed Commission recommended that minibus taxis be made illegal. This move 
resulted in draft legislation that, according to McCaul (1990:45), proposed the following: 
• Taxis are defined as vehicle carrying no more than 4 passengers; 
• Mini-buses should carry 5 to 25 passengers and should operate on fixed routes, fixed   
timetables, using approved tariffs; and 
• All taxis are fitted with a meter. 
 
The draft bill was opposed by the South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA), the private 
sector and even the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers (NAAMSA) (McCaul, 
1990:45).  
In 1985 Mr. Chris Heunis the then Minister of Constitutional Development initiated another 
transport enquiry. Sixteen-seater minibus taxis were recommended by the National Transport 
Policy Study should be allowed to operate and the local authorities should set quotas and restrict 
new permits. According to Barret (2003:7), the Competition Board opposed the quota system in 
favour of the total deregulation of the taxi industry. Barret (2003:7) states that finally the 
National Transport Policy Study recommended that:  
• Sixteen-seater minibus taxis be allowed to operate as taxis; 
• The number of taxis to be allowed in each regional service council should be stipulated 
by central government; 
• The regional council to control the maximum number of taxis in the regional service 
council using a quota basis;   
• The formula used in the quota should also consider rank space; and  
• Applicants should no longer be required to prove the need for a service. 
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The National Transport Policy Study had its own findings in which highlighted that the then 
existing regulatory framework was contrary to the principles of national economic policy and 
counterproductive to competition. This statement resulted in the Competition Board, 
recommending the immediate and blanket deregulation of the taxi industry. In January 1987 the 
White Paper on National Transport Policy agreed to the Competition Board’s recommendation, 
that entry to the taxi industry should be controlled only by consideration of whether the operator 
had met certain technical requirements. All other recommendations made by the National 
Transport Policy Study were accepted by the White Paper on National Transport Policy except 
the recommendation for the government to set minima on the number of taxis in each regional 
council. It was recommended that the regional councils could set maxima using a formula based 
on considerations such as rank space (McCaul, 1990:51 & Fourie, 2003:35). 
The South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA) was of the view that the abolition of all 
entry restrictions of an economic nature would create chaos and fragmentation of the industry, 
with too many taxi operators entering the market too rapidly without looking at the viability of 
routes. As per the anticipation of the South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA), soon after 
the permits ceased to be a priority, the taxi industry was soon (Fourie, 2003:35) flooded with 
aspirant drivers and this led to the heightened competition for passengers and routes. Corrupt 
officials took advantage of the free for all market and turned a blind eye to traffic enforcement 
and vehicle, roadworthiness, meaning that from the outset issues of safety and security were 
compromised (Sekhonyane & Duguard, 2004:13). 
 
2.3.3 The period from 1987 to 1994 
The White Paper of 1987 on Transport Policy, along with Transportation Deregulation Act No 
80 of 1988 effectively legalised the 16-seater minibus taxis. The private sector warmly accepted 
the government’s policy had taken a positive step towards the creation of a market-driven 
transport system. In contrast, the organised taxi industry saw the White Paper as a threat to its 
interest because it was introducing deregulation that was going to flood routes with taxis, thus 
making most routes unprofitable.  According Khosa (1995:175), the South African Black Taxi 
Association (SABTA) rejected the White Paper entirely because they perceived it as an attempt 
by the government to hijack the black transport sector and resuscitate the power of the white bus 
industry by making it possible for taxis to flood the routes and make them unprofitable. The 
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South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA) wanted a controlled phased-in deregulation 
over a period of ten years because they were also skeptical that whites could build their financial 
empires and use that financial power to invade the black taxi industry (Khosa, 1995:175). The 
other thing was that SABTA perceived deregulation as something that could be used by whites 
who had the capital to enter this business because deregulation meant that anybody – including 
Whites – could operate a taxi industry (Khosa, 1995:175). 
The evidence suggests that South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA) wanted to have a 
virtual monopoly in the taxi industry. In the same way as the railways appealed for protection in 
1930, and the bus industry pleaded for protection in 1983, the legal taxi industry implored the 
Government to protect established taxi operators in 1987 (Khosa, 1995:175). In the words of the 
then president of the South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA) - James Ngcoya - the 
White Paper was betraying the taxi industry and he called on taxi operators to no longer trust the 
Government, thus formally cutting the links between the taxi association and the Government 
(Khosa, 1995:175). Finally, South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA) was recognized by 
Government as the representatives of the taxi industry and several meetings were held between 
them that resolved this impasse (Khosa, 1995:176).  
The largest share of the commuter market in 1989 was held by around 50 000 minibus taxis 
operating nationally. The policy confusion assisted taxi owners to manage to enter into the 
industry. Entry into the minibus market was allowed to be determined by market forces during 
the deregulation process, which encouraged almost any applicant to be granted a permit to 
operate a minibus taxi (Barret, 2003:7). Between 1987 and 1994 (Fourie, 2003:35) the minibus 
taxi industry grew at a phenomenal rate in South Africa. 
The taxi violence that has engulfed the taxi industry since 1987 led to the rise of taxi associations 
as the taxi industry was deregulated. The taxi industry quickly became a contested economic 
terrain flooded with aspirant operators hoping to become rich, as it was one of the first avenues 
for black capital accumulation. Some other taxi owners were able to make it in the tax industry 
and it was soon characterized by exploitation and aggressive competition between operators 
attempting to poach passengers and ply the same routes (Sekhonyane & Duguard, 2004:15). 
 
The competition between taxi operators resulted in them also starting to operate in high-demand 
corridors serviced by bus and rail. Taxi operators took this step to boost their income as the 
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original taxi routes had become highly contested. This service replication reduced the level of 
service and potential cost recovery of a route or mode, which is clearly a case of destructive 
competition as defined by Shaw (1998:18). Buses and rail had to compete with taxis and buses 
and rail operators responded to the lower demand by reducing service frequency. Formal modes 
were now requiring subsidies due to lower-cost recovery as the taxis were dominating the 
transport industry. Shaw (1998:18) states that competition between operators reduced the 
potential for sustained cost recovery by individual operators, reduced the economic viability of 
the routes and led to the provision of poor and inconsistent service levels to commuters.  
The National Transport Policy Forum (NTPF) was established in September 1992 to bring 
together a range of interest groups that were excluded from contributing to the formulation of 
transport policy. Groups represented in the forum at its inception included the African National 
Congress (ANC), civil associations, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 
the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CTLSA), the National African Federated 
Transport Organisation (NAFTO), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), The South Africa Black 
Taxi Association (SABTA) and Transnet (Khosa, 1995:183). 
The National Transport Policy Forum (NTPF), in conjunction with the Department of Transport 
and Transported, held a Taxi for Peace indaba in 1993 in Johannesburg, where resolutions that 
were taken were incorporated into the transport policy document. The Government accepted the 
National Transport Policy Study principles on the passengers’ transport policy. A decision was 
made that the Road Passenger Quality System (RPQS) should replace the Road Transport Permit 
System (RTPS) to promote deregulation of the passenger transport industry. The Competition 
Board recommended to the cabinet that the minibus taxi industry should have minimal entry 
requirements, related only to the fitness of the vehicle, the possession of a valid licence by the 
driver, and proof of insurance cover. The Government accepted this advice, thereby rejecting the 
recommendation of the NTPS that gave protection to the taxi industry (Khosa, 1995:174).  
The then Minister of Transport, Dr Piet Wegemoed accepted in principle that it was unfair to 
exclude taxis from wider public transport subsidies (Behrens & Wilkinson, 2001:5). The 
Department of Transport proposed a corridor principle as the basis for extending subsidies to taxi 
operators. In terms of the corridor basis, commuters were to buy one subsidised ticket that could 
be used on taxis, buses, and trains. The Development Bank of South Africa proposed that the 
government should spend the subsidy funds on the taxi industry through providing free business 
training and improving taxi operator’s working conditions (Behrens & Wilkinson, 2001:5). 
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2.3.4 The period between 1994 to 1999 
According to Dugard (2001:3), in the post-apartheid period taxi violence became more 
widespread, decentralised and criminal in character as compared to the period prior to 1994 
where taxi wars were relatively few in number. Taxi violence started escalating and resulted in 
the death of people. The number of people died on the road was less than those who died because 
of taxi violence (Fourie, 2003:37). “Taxis constitute only 2% to 3% of vehicles on South African 
roads, but are involved in 17% of accidents. In 1998 taxis were involved in 70 000 accidents that 
killed 900 passengers and 1385 drivers” (Fourie, 2003:37). 
The government established the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) in 1995 with an aim of 
attempting to address the issue of taxi violence in South Africa. The purpose of the National Taxi 
Task Team (NTTT) and among other duties was to eliminate taxi conflicts and enhance the 
performance of the taxi industry in coming up with other ways of improving road safety. On 20 
April 1995 the National Taxi Task Team held its first meeting chaired by a member from the 
National Department of Transport (NDT) consisting of the nine government officials from 
provincial departments of transport, ten taxi industry representatives, and nine special advisors 
(Dugard, 2001:21). 
According to Barret (2003:14), the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) conducted 36 public 
hearings throughout the country between August 1995 and January 1996 and held two plenary 
meetings. The 300-page report, including recommendations, was compiled and submitted to the 
Transport Minister in August 1996. The findings included the following:  
• Complaints about the subsidies that are allocated to public transport but not taxis;  
• High financial costs when replacing vehicles, which are also coupled with the difficulties faced 
by commuters in meeting any increases in taxi fares; 
• The on-going violent conflict; 
• Safety in the taxi industry; 
• The fragmentation of owners’ associations; 
• Poor conditions of employment; and 
• Problems with transport infrastructure, such as roads and taxi ranks. 
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According to Barret (2003:14), the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) concluded that the self-
regulation in the taxi industry had failed and the following factors were indicative of such 
failures: surplus of taxi permits, many of which were falsified or duplicated documents; a highly 
fragmented industry structure with no single national association to represent its needs and an 
acute shortage of skills ranging from business and negotiation skills through to customer 
relations and even driving tactics; and vehicle maintenance procedure and safety practices.  
Based on the above-mentioned findings, the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) recommended 
that there should be immediate re-regulation and formalisation of the taxi industry. Fourie 
(2003:38) states that the main proposals for regulation involved the following three integrated 
processes:  
• A moratorium should be placed on the issuing of the permits; 
• The operating taxis should be registered and the areas in which such taxis were operating; 
and  
• A special dispensation should be introduced to legalise the illegal operators that were 
operating without permits.  
Subsequently, in 1996, the National Department of Transport (NDoT) drew up a White Paper on 
the future policy objectives. The objective of the White Paper was to provide leadership in the 
promotion of a reliable, safe, coordinated, efficient, integrated and environmentally friendly land 
passenger transport system. The White Paper was to be implemented in South Africa’s urban and 
rural areas and the Southern African region in order to ensure a pleasant experience for 
commuters while improving the levels of mobility and accessibility (Fourie, 2003:38).  
 
The Moving South Africa (MSA) project was launched in June 1997 to implement the vision set 
out in the White Paper in a way that would be compatible with an environment of limited 
resources, capacity and time. The MSA’s strategy was based on a 20-year forecast, which was in 
line with global transport trends. The project identified the critical problems in transport and 
proposed a framework for the sector to deliver a world-class service. The gaps between customer 
needs and what the transport system was providing was identified as a developmental area 
(Fourie, 2003:38). 
27 
 
The MSA confirmed that there was a critical lack of affordable access to transport. The project 
further revealed that the public transport system was ineffective and inefficient, which resulted in 
an increased dependence on private cars. Urban development aggravated problems that were not 
taken into consideration or planned in tandem with the transportation system (Fourie, 2003:38). 
The MSA identified the creation of an enabling framework for the minibus taxi industry to 
recapitalise its assets and deepen its ability to compete fairly for market share as one of the 
government’s key tasks (Fourie, 2003:39).  
The combination of recommendations of the NTTT and MSA led to negotiations between the 
government and taxi organizations, which ultimately saw all taxi organizations agreeing to work 
together. As a result, the South African Taxi Council (SATACO) was formed in August 1998 
(Fourie, 1998:39). The objective of SATACO was the promotion of peace and unity in the taxi 
industry as well as the development of economic benefits and empowerment of taxi operators 
(Fourie, 2003:39). The council has divisions in all nine provinces and it represents all minibus 
taxi operators.  
SATACO together with the National Department of Transport (NDT) agreed to re-do the issuing 
of new permits to emerging taxi entrepreneurs (since most routes were already over-traded) in a 
bid to end conflicts. Both parties planned to introduce a colour-coded route system, satellite 
surveillance and a taxi card fare system for commuters (where they were no longer going to use 
cash) (Fourie, 2003:40). Working together between SATACO and NDT signified that the South 
African government recognised the taxi industry and took well-intended actions to relieve the 
problems in the industry after the launch of the NDT. According to Fourie (2003:40), the MSA 
project did not present a detailed solution to the problems in the taxi industry, but it identified the 
dilemma in the transport industry which revealed formalisation and regulation as the probable 
answers. 
 
2.3.5  The period between 1999 to 2009 
The apparent failure of the government’s plan to re-regulate the taxi industry led to the 
government changing its re-regulation focus to restructuring the industry through the 
recapitalisation process. In essence, the recapitalisation strategy aimed to recreate the taxi 
industry from scratch, phasing out the 16-seater minibus taxis in favour of new 18- and 35-
seaters, and introducing smart card technology to eliminate cash from commuter transactions. 
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Re-regulation and recapitalisation processes had challenges and seven years later after the 
introduction of recapitalisation it has not yet been fully implemented. These challenges were 
experienced from both the side of government and the industry. The government needed to 
engage meaningfully with the taxi owners in order to be able to properly formalise the taxi 
industry (Sekhonyane & Dugard, 2 004:17). 
Under the recapitalisation plan, jointly developed by the departments of transport, trade and 
industry, minerals and energy, and finance. The government was to subsidise owners to help 
them buy the new 18- to 35-seat taxi (Fourie, 2003:40). The idea was to replace the current 140 
000 units of 10- and 15-seater petrol-powered taxis in the country with approximately 80 000 
units of 18- and 35-seater diesel-powered taxis. This replacement was to take place over a period 
of five years and was supposed to streamline the public transport system in the country (Fourie, 
2003:40). 
The non-commercial goal of the recapitalisation project has been the regulatory management of 
the industry with a view to improving road safety and decreasing violence within the informal 
taxi industry. This process was to give the SA government a fiscal mechanism for controlling the 
roadworthiness of taxi vehicles by manipulating the capital depreciation period (Fourie, 
2003:41). 
It was difficult for the government to deal with the issue of recapitalisation because it was not 
clear as to who represented the taxi industry. Both SATACO  and its splinter group the National 
Taxi Alliance (NTA) both claimed to represent the taxi industry. The members from SATACO 
who were not satisfied splinted and formed the National Taxi Association in 1999.  The splinter 
in SATACO delayed the implementation because there were concerns over cost implications.  
 
According to Dugard (2001:25), the NTA disputed that they recognize SATACO and NTA were 
not part of approving the planned recapitalization of the industry. NTA  views was that the plans 
to restructure the industry were compounding the challenges in the industry and  that 
recapitalization was directly responsible for the chaos and violence engulfing the taxi industry 
(Dugard, 2001:25). The formation of the National Taxi Drivers Organisation (NATDO) came 
into effect claiming to be representing the interest of taxi drivers. The NATDO had a fear that 
there would be job losses because of restructuring, so they embarked on a series of highly 
publicised protests against the recapitalisation (Fourie, 2003:42). 
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The government passed the National Land Transport Transition Act (Act No 22 of 2000) in order 
to assist to formalise and re-regulate the taxi industry. A 4-year re-recapitalisation scheme was 
instituted by the government together with new legislation in the same year the intention of the 
scheme was to replace the 15-seater minibuses with 18- and 35-seater minibuses. Electronic 
systems were to replace the traditional manual fare collection so that tax revenue could be 
established. The movement and control of the vehicles were going to be controlled at the central 
point by the vehicle tracking systems (Barret, 2003:16).  
This move was not met with enthusiasm from many of the taxi associations, as it would 
ultimately cost the operators substantially. The most widely publicised and certainly the most 
ambitious Government intervention in the minibus taxi industry was the Recapitalisation 
programme.  
The government delayed the recapitalisation process as it was waiting for the taxi industry to 
form one association that could speak on behalf of taxi owners; taxi owners disagreed to the 
nature and form that the recapitalisation scheme should take. 
The NTTT suggested that provincial registrars be established. The NTTT also suggested that the 
industry be organised into co-operatives, which would not only consolidate the industry as part 
of the formal economy, but would also allow it to provide important services relating to vehicle 
maintenance. When the taxi industry was regulated as per the recommendations (Dugard, 
2001:22) of the NTTT there was an increase nationwide of taxi violence, which was suspected to 
be orchestrated recapitalisation. In September 2001, delegates of all democratically elected taxi 
structures (SATACO and the NTA), provincial councils, as well as mother bodies held a national 
taxi conference in Durban. This conference resulted in the establishment of the SANTACO, 
which embodied the aspiration of all taxi operators. The new constitution for the taxi industry 
was adopted at the conference and also new leadership was elected and took several resolutions 
on all pertinent matters in the taxi industry. One of the important resolutions was to improve road 
safety, cooperation with law enforcement, endorsement of the recapitalisation programme and 
improved service to commuters (Fourie, 2003:42). Some groups of members were aggrieved 
claiming to be NTA disown SANTACO in the press briefing because some of their members 
were not elected in the executive positions (Barret 2003:22-23). 
SANTACO supported the taxi recapitalisation programme because it anticipated that the 
majority of taxi owners would opt for the 18- and the 35-seater vehicles. Despite its overall 
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support for the recapitalisation process, SANTACO was concerned about the operators who were 
operating in the townships because they were not going to benefit from the recapitalisation 
programme, as their profit margins were too small to put them in a position to afford the vehicle 
instalments. This concern for certain categories of operators did, however, not detract 
SANTACO’s overall support for taxi recapitalisation (Barret, 2003:18). 
SANTACO supported the government’s plans to recapitalise the industry and agreed to work 
with authorities to implement the proposed programme. The government proposed the 
introduction of an electronic management system (EMS) that was going to use an efficient and 
transparent fare payment system and also to track down each taxi by location at any given time 
for regulatory purposes. SANTACO itself was going to assist in efficient management but the 
industry would decide who should provide the technology (SANTACO, 2002).  
Various associations representing taxi drivers exerted pressure on both the government and the 
taxi industry organisations by using both negotiations and violence as a means of ensuring their 
status as indispensable role-players in the recapitalisation process. According to Barret 
(2003:15), in recapitalisation the owners handing in old vehicles in order to access the scrapping 
allowance were not obliged to purchase new ones. The scrapping allowance was therefore not 
only an incentive to purchase new and safer vehicles which was linked to a range of controls, but 
it was also an incentive to reduce the total number of vehicles in the industry.  
One major sticking point was that there was no accurate projection of possible job losses because 
the field study conducted by the National Productivity Institute (NPI) under the auspices of the 
National Department of Transport (NDoT) was abandoned in early 2000 as a result of alleged 
threats against the research team by taxi owners (Barret, 2003:17). According to Barret 
(2003:17), the government’s expected net effects of the taxi recapitalisation were: 
• Payment of income tax by owners; 
• Reduction in number of operators and/or vehicles; 
• Safer vehicles on the road; 
• The registration of employees; and 
• Improved data collection on industry statistics.  
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The industry has undergone a significant process of formalisation and development over the past 
years. The industry has built a relationship with government authorities to deal with the many 
problems it faces. SANTACO plays a role of negotiating on service, maintenance and supply 
deals on behalf of its members and mediates in the event of conflicts over the routes between 
local taxi associations (Barret, 2003:23). 
 
2.3.6  The period between 2009 to date 
In 2006 the government announced the establishment of the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system, 
which was to be implemented in 2009. The first prototype of a BRT system was in Chicago in 
1937. The first wide-scale development of the BRT concept using bus technology occurred in 
Curitiba (Brazil) in 1974, the first modern-day system where buses travelled on dedicated lanes 
making several stops on designated routes. These buses keep millions of commuters moving 
rapidly around the city every year. This system was the first modern-day BRT (Wright, 
2004:12). 
The BRT system had its own challenges in that at its inception it was not supported by most taxi 
operators because it was cheaper and was targeting the same market as that of the taxi industry 
and using dedicated that gave the BRT a more competitive advantage than the taxis. Taxi 
associations were blaming government for implementing the BRT without thoroughly explaining 
how it would affect the taxi industry. According to Gabara (2009), the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between the Mayor Amos Masondo and representatives from the 
Johannesburg Taxi Industry was signed in October 2007 to mark the opening of the BRT system. 
The signing of the MOU is followed on from the culmination of a lengthy process of 
consultation between the city and the taxi industry on various issues regarding the future of 
public transport.  
At the start of the operation of the BRT, which in Johannesburg was named Rea Vaya, the 
system was in principle supported by the Johannesburg Taxi Industry Negotiating Team (JTIN). 
The JTIN team comprised Johannesburg representatives from the nine taxi associations that were 
affected by the BRT. According to De Bruyn (2009), the invitation was also extended to 
SANTACO and the NTA but neither group sent representatives. The city of Johannesburg was 
accused of side-lining some relevant parties by the taxi drivers and operators and protested 
against the implementation of the BRT, this caused some fragments of the taxi industry to feel 
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aggrieved by the perceived insensitivity of the government in implementing a large-scale public 
transport system that would undermine the livelihoods of the taxi operators in the cities of Cape 
Town and Johannesburg. The SANTACO and NTA accused the authorities of devising a plan 
without consulting the country's most important public transport industry on a plan that was 
invariably going to result in a loss of income for taxi operators. The implementation of BRT led 
to the taxi strikes in 2009 in both Johannesburg and Cape Town (Serino, 2009). 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Since the establishment of the taxi industry, it has grown to be one of the most recognised 
commuter transport industries, which also contributes to the creation of jobs and the increase in 
the economy of the country (Gross Domestic product GDP). Regulation and deregulation of the 
taxi industry by the government unfortunately had an impact in endemic violence and crime in 
that sector, which nevertheless did not hold back the expansion of the taxi industry. The abolition 
of entry restrictions to the taxi industry created chaos and fragmentation of the industry and taxi 
operators preferred to protect their territory. The formation of SANTACO representing the entire 
taxi industry in the country made a difference as it resulted in the decrease of taxi violence; and 
for once, the government had a specific body to engage with on the restructuring of transport and 
the taxi industry. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF TAXI VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Taxi violence in South Africa was the tool that the apartheid regime used to pursue their interest 
by dividing the people so that they will acquire what they needed (Sekhonyane & Dugard, 
200:15). The state prevented entrepreneurs from operating kombi taxis by refusing to issue road 
carrier permits to them. The competition between rail and buses, which was and is subsidised by 
the government, also played a role because taxis were losing commuters. 
The refusal by the government to grant permits hamstrung the growth of the taxi industry by 
making the operation of most taxis illegal and subjecting its operators to prosecutions and the 
confiscation of their vehicles. Despite all these challenges the kombi taxis defied all the odds and 
became the commonly used form of public transport in black communities. The violent taxi 
associations called “mother bodies” have been allowed to develop and expand virtually 
unchecked by the authorities. Taxi associations (also known as the Mother bodies) have been 
behind most of the violence that has come to be associated with the taxi industry, refusing rivals 
to operate over dominant routes. Government officials became part of the problem and not of the 
solution. Police officers were members of the association and government officials in the 
authority board were flooding the system. 
 
3.2 TAXI VIOLENCE NATIONALLY 
The history of the South African taxi industry was closely linked to the history of apartheid. 
Blacks, in particular African people, had a very limited legal access to business opportunities as 
the institutionalised racism and the feature of apartheid was introduced in the early 1960s 
(Barret, 2003:6). In the taxi industry it was virtually impossible for an African person to acquire 
a permit to operate. The few who did operate used sedan cars, as sedan cars were the only 
vehicles recognised for tax purposes. They catered for a very small African market. Public 
transport was totally dominated by the state-owned rail sector and the subsidised bus industry 
(part publicly and part privately owned) (Barret, 2003:6). 
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The taxi industry was the first black source of income. In 1930 there was a Motor Carrier 
Transportation Act, which stipulated that no transportation of goods or passengers was allowed 
without permission from a local road transportation board (Sekhonyane & Dugard, 2004:14). For 
the black operators it was impossible to obtain a permit because they had to prove that they had a 
formal employment record, had lived in the area for number of years and were in possession of a 
daily labourers permit (Sekhonyane & Dugard, 2004:14). Most of the taxis operated illegally 
using private saloon vehicles as taxis. Ninety per cent of African permit applications were 
rejected because of the requirements that made it impossible to obtain a permit. 
The taxi industry was the business that was dominantly owned by African people. In most cases 
the people who were taxi owners started by being taxi drivers. When they bought a second 
vehicle they employed a driver and when they had three taxis they stopped to be the drivers and 
started managing the business. Taxi violence can be traced back to the 1980s and 1990s as part 
of apartheid laws and the apartheid agenda. 
Taxi owners employed the taxi operators to work in their business.  The industry was a part of 
the informal economy in which the majority of operators were not registered employees and tax 
payers or adhered to any minimum standards of employment (Barret, 2003:1). However, the 
majority did possess licences to operate through the provincial registration processes, and the 
majority of drivers were licensed by public driving permits.  
The taxi industry was celebrated as 'one of the most extraordinary socio-economic phenomena in 
South Africa in recent years'. Advocates of free market enterprise saw the growth of the taxi 
industry as a 'silent revolution transforming South Africa into one of the most integrated 
economies' and as the fruit of 'popular non-racial capitalism'. According to Khosa (1992:232), 
some analysts have acclaimed the taxi industry as one of the 'success stories' of black small 
businesses.  
Like any other business the taxi industry needs to be regulated. In the apartheid era no regulation 
regulated the taxi industry. Most of the people were working in the way that suited them because 
the government fuelled the taxi violence for its own benefit (Dugard, 2001:4). The local taxi 
industries established taxi associations that were able to guide and manage routes and taxi fares. 
The industry produced different kinds of employment, drivers, queue marshals, car washers and 
in some areas there were fare collectors who travelled in the kombis. The total number of people 
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directly employed in the sector was around 185,000 in early year 2000. The demographics were 
not known in terms of race, how many whites, blacks, coloured and Indians.  
 
3.2.1  Unions in the taxi industry 
In 1998 South African Tax Association (SATACO) was established with an aim to achieve 
peace, unity, development of economic benefits and empowerment for all operators in the taxi 
industry as the government’s attempts failed to resolve taxi violence. SATACO wanted to 
change the whole operation in the taxi industry in order to create a sustainable framework for 
formalised economic development within the industry, which would ease the insecurities 
amongst taxi bosses. SANTACO did achieve its objective because there was a decline in 
incidents of taxi violence across the country. 
There were two national trade unions, the South African Transport and Allied Workers’ Union 
(SATAWU) and the National Taxi Drivers’ Organization (NATDO. A new unified body 
representing around 90% of owners across all nine provinces was established in September 2001. 
SANTACO comprised the two existing national taxi bodies (the South African Taxi Council 
(SATC) and the NTA), as well as government representatives. Ten executive members were 
elected at the taxi industry conference with their national office established in Pretoria. The 
industry has undergone a significant process of formalisation and development over the past 
years and SATAWU has also been heavily involved in industry restructuring efforts (Barret, 
2003:4). 
The violence in the taxi industry did not only affect the associations who were in disputes with 
the routes or ranks but it affected the community at large. If violence erupted employees failed to 
go to work, which also had a negative impact on the economy of the country. Public or private 
service delivery was being hampered. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
condemned taxi violence in the City of Cape Town and urged provincial government and 
Metrorail to put in place an urgent plan to confront the crisis and to include labour, business and 
the taxi bosses to contribute to finding solutions. SANTACO was not affiliated to COSATU but 
the workers under COSATU were affected when there was violence. The members could end up 
being charged for failing to report on duty or being late at work. Tony Ehrenreich, COSATU's 
Western Cape Provincial Secretary (Sapa, 2011), indicated that taxi bosses had a right to protest 
to the government because the government was seen as the cause of the problem.  
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3.2.2  Taxi associations (also known as mother bodies) 
The number of taxi operators flooded the taxi industry as there were no strict rules in obtaining 
the operating licence because of deregulation. Deregulation in the taxi industry resulted in the 
formation of taxi associations in which the members protected their territory so that they would 
be able to make profit by limiting the number of taxis to operate on those routes. The taxi 
associations called ‘mother bodies’ were created and eventually expanded without being checked 
and controlled. 
The operations on the routes were regulated by the mother bodies. Mother bodies regulated the 
fares to be paid if the taxi owner wanted to be a member of the association, including 
involvement in day-to-day operations of the industry (Khosa, 1991:236). Taxi operators in the 
association made informal arrangements with each other on how they should operate (Boudreaux 
2006:23). 
Dugard (2001:20) indicates that the associations had mother bodies to protect their territory; they 
were doing all they could to protect routes that they were operating on, in order for the rivals not 
to ply in the same routes. Mother bodies had the upper hand in the association because of the 
power they possessed. According to Boudreaux (2006:23) mother bodies were the ones who 
dictated how the associations should function in protection of their routes. In most instances 
izinkabi were being hired by mother bodies in order to execute those rivals who came and 
operated on their protected routes. Mother bodies collected money from the taxi operators in the 
association in order to enable them to perform their duties as the body (Dugard 2001:20). 
Most of the violence that took place in the industry was associated with mother bodies. Taxi 
associations used threats of violence and violence itself to enforce their arrangements 
(Boudreaux 2006:23). They used considerable firepower and weight to resist recent attempts to 
re-regulate the taxi industry and they were symptomatic of more general levels of organised 
crime in post-apartheid South Africa (Dugaurd: 2001:4). The root of taxi violence and the 
reasons for its continuation were located in the unresolved socio-economic conditions in South 
Africa. 
The corrupt regulating bodies that replaced the state’s eventually discarded rules, which then led 
to the industry becoming increasingly criminal in nature. According to Dugard (2001:20), mafia-
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like tactics including the hiring of hitmen soon exhibited gang warfare and price fixing. The race 
factor divided the mother bodies. Coloureds established a strictly coloured mother body in which 
other races were not allowed to become members and they attempted to monopolise new routes 
(Dugard, 2001:18). Coloureds and Africans both wanted to ply the same routes, which led to 
violence and the racial aspect of taxi violence.  
In Soshanguve many people were killed in taxi-related turf wars between 1996 and 2000, which 
resulted in the establishment of the provincial government’s Commission of Enquiry, which 
investigated the causes and extent of taxi violence in Gauteng.  The commission’s report 
maintained that police in some instances were directly involved in the shooting of drivers and 
passengers and not only provided weaponry and protection for hit squads in the Shoshanguve 
area ((Dugard, 2001:7). Some police officials were found to have a direct interest in the industry, 
privately owning around 10% of the taxi fleet in the area. Barret (2003:9) states that in early 
2000 all minibus taxi operations in Soshanguve were closed by the authorities following the 
findings of the commission and on-going violence. In February 2000 seven men from Wits 
African Taxi Association (WATA) went to court. They were accused of plotting attacks on 
working drivers and commuters using the services of the rival association. Their alleged 
intention was to destabilise the industry and to recapture a diminishing market in the chaos that 
would ensue. The court case was the one of the very few that brought to light the relationship 
between competition for routes and the taxi wars (Barret, 2003:9). 
Taxi squads were created by associations because of the failure of the government’s law 
enforcement. According to Boudreaux (2006:20), mother bodies had taxi squads that were 
patrolling with their cars to protect their area. If offenders were found, the association disciplined 
such an operator by threats or violence. Mother bodies behaved in this way because they had 
invested many resources to develop lucrative routes and business.  
 
3.2.3 Hitmen  
When taxi violence erupted it affected innocent people who were not part of the violence and the 
hired-gunmen-executed killings did not care about the lives of the commuters. Khosa (1991:232) 
states that some of the people in the association hired hitmen in order to kill the rivals who were 
contesting with them for the same route. Dugard (2001:18) states that mother bodies went as far 
as hiring the hitmen from other neighbouring countries in order to make it difficult for that 
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person to be traced. The hit squad carried out all the assassinations as per the directive from the 
mother body. Their payments were on a monthly basis or after the execution of job. Allied 
mother bodies collaborated in the protection against syndicates of hostile vehicle hijackers 
(Dugard, 2001:20).  
Members of the mother body’ executive made real money. Mother bodies didn’t have financial 
reports where they went to report the finance of the association and how the finances had been 
used. They made a lot of money doing collection and there were no track record of the money 
paid, as there were no receipts of payment received. Dugard (2001:20) indicated that being an 
executive member of the mother body you became rich and powerful in no space of time and that 
is why the top positions in mother bodies were so viciously contested. The operation of taxi 
routes might necessitate violence in order to protect that route, but violence or the threat if 
violence was also used by mother body bosses to extract money as well as compliance from the 
bosses of other routes within the taxi fraternity (Dugard, 2001:20).  
The powerful individuals in the mother body caused internal tension with the increasing 
resources invested in taxi associations. The power struggle emerged within the mother body, 
which caused the same members of the association to fight against each other; as the defence was 
more about association resources than taxi operations (Dugard, 2001:20). The competition for 
the control and domination of routes in the industry resulted in the increase of violent incidents, 
particular murders by hired guns. There were those busy routes that most of the taxi owners had 
interest in (Sekhonyane & Duguard, 2004:15); those that already operated in those routes did not 
allow new people who wanted to join and work with them; and they were protected their 
territory. Lucrative routes were central to successful taxi operation. Rival owners increasingly 
resorted to violence to eliminate competition and the assassination of rivals added a sinister 
dimension to the conflict. 
The entire government effort to root out corruption was undermined by corrupt police who 
colluded with criminals. The worse thing that happened was the killing of people in daylight 
(Khosa, 1991:232). According to Dugard (2001:20), mentioned that the mafia-style killings, 
drive-by shootings were used by the hitmen to kill taxi operators, including commuters inside 
that targeted taxi. 
 
3.2.4 Political forces and influence  
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Safety and security issues were side-lined by corrupt officials who turned a blind eye on traffic 
law enforcement. James Chapman (Sekhonyane & Duguard, 2004:15), a long time consultant to 
the taxi industry said “they [taxi operators] were divided by the [apartheid] government and 
violence was encouraged” against the black drop of escalating violence. During the final years of 
apartheid regime the stage was set for the violent taxi wars that came to dominate the deregulated 
industry. 
The apartheid government used taxi industry for its own benefit, as taxi violence was fuelled by 
the political conflict. The most politically motivated wars played themselves out in the Cape 
Peninsular at the height of political violence, between 1990 and 1992. It is a known truth that 
during apartheid there was a third force. The policy of divide and rule of the Nationalist party’s 
government thrived. The taxi violence was disguised by so called Inkatha and ANC violence. 
The real targets of taxi violence were commuters themselves. The interrelated attack of political 
parties led to the associations’ arming their drivers to counter attack if they were being attacked. 
In the Cape Peninsula the taxi conflict played major role in destabilising the ANC in an area to 
an extent that that the National party ended up gaining lots of political ground in areas as well in 
the provincial government. 
 
3.2.5 Police involvement 
In the submission by the then KZN Minister Sibusiso Ndebele (2000) the taxi industry had 
always been understood as African entrepreneurship. In order to succeed in your business you 
needed to gain the protection of the police and the officials in the department. Complaints and 
accusations were received persistently that police were being bribed by the taxi owners and 
associations. In 1995 the then national commissioner George Fivas took a decision that police 
should not own taxis but nothing came out of this. The police were often biased in favour of one 
association over another (Boudreaux, 2006:20).  
The ownership of the taxi by the police or government officials was a problem in the fight 
against taxi violence. Because it was difficult to deal with the issues of the taxi industry the 
police and government officials turned to be biased to the associations that they were registered 
with. According to Shaw (1995:49-50), cases that were reported by the rival association with 
which police officers were not affiliated were neglected or poorly investigated. The incapacity in 
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training of police officials in dealing with unique cases led to poor results in combating taxi 
related crimes. 
The escalation of taxi violence in the taxi industry resorted to the taxi associations having their 
own agencies or security guards to monitor the routes. The police were biased in terms of dealing 
with taxi crime issues. Members of the Urban Monitoring and Action Committee (UMAC) were 
attacked in the presence of the police (Dugard, 2001:7). Information was given to the police 
about threats or crime that might take place but the police ignored those warnings. The UMAC 
contacted the police concerning the threat of violence to take place that night (by WEBTA) in the 
area which is about 100 metres away from the station but police failed to attend to it and indeed 
the violence did take place. 
The police actively participated in taxi violence not only by not attending to the complaints 
reported but also by their involvement in the attack. If you were on the opposite side that they 
did not favour you would be shot at by the police. Dugard (2001:7) indicates that the taxi 
operators would run to the police for assistance or protection if there was violence only to find 
out that the police were also shooting at the operators and were not restoring peace. Members of 
associations carried firearms and dangerous weapons in front of the police but they were not 
disarmed. A video clip was captured where the police failed to disarm the large group of Webta 
members after two minibuses were attacked in a pro-Lagunya area of Khayelitsha (Dugard, 
2001:7).  
Police were also pointed out as part of the problem, instead of stabilising the situation. Different 
reports collected by the Black Sash and UMAC contained repeated claims that uniformed police 
or men wearing balaclavas participated in the attacks. Police officials were either active partisans 
in many areas but their calculated inaction fanned the conflict, as accusations of deficient 
policing ranged from failing to make arrests to shooting at escaping victims.  
Government had declared war on taxi violence but instead of helping to eliminate crime and 
violence a good number of police were known to be undermining the effort by associating with 
the criminals for financial gain. 
In cases where a taxi association was fighting with rivals police were involved directly in 
shooting as they backed their association against its rival (Dugard, 2001:28). Police officials in 
the industry used state resources to fight battles and even kill in favour of the association. Guns 
and uniforms would be hired out to the mother bodies for criminal activities and returned back to 
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police. Some police officials worked as body guards to senior executives of the mother bodies. 
The police who were properly investing the case would find it difficult to get information that led 
to the conviction of perpetrators because of police being part of the association. Dugard 
(2001:25) indicate that if it happened that cases were opened there was a high likelihood that the 
dockets would go missing or the investigation would be tampered with or poorly investigated 
and no one was brought to book. According to Shaw (1995:49-50), case dockets were stolen 
while in the hands of the police.  
People who witness to the incidents during the taxi violence were afraid to come forth as they 
could become the victims for witnessing of such an incident because of some police officials 
who were implicated in the attacks (Boudreaux, 2006:21).  The non-intervention by the police 
gave the taxi operators the power to think that they could take the law into their hands, the 
ineffective law enforcement and complicity in the taxi violence exacerbated problems associated 
with increased competition (Boudreaux, 2006:24). 
The suspicion of police involvement in the taxi violence (Dugard, 2001:25) led to the members 
of the Maphumulo Taxi Association reporting a complaint to the Independent Complaints 
Directorate (ICD) to investigate police suspected to be involved in taxi violence because all 
efforts to address the violence had proved futile.  
According to Khumalo (2002), the NTT’s final recommendation in 1996 on taxi processes 
clearly highlighted the ownership of taxis by police personnel as the key cause of violence within 
the taxi industry, said by the MEC of Transport Ndebele. “the ownership of taxi businesses by 
policemen was contributing to violence in the already volatile taxi industry, with at least 47 
policemen having been found to be running taxi operations”. Police officers who are the owners 
of the taxi become conflicted and make the lives of the other colleagues to be in danger because 
they are not addressing taxi related issues objectively because they will be having vested interest. 
Police register taxi under family names and they are not directly linked. 
Boudreaux (2006:24) states that an operation would be planned by the police to combat crime in 
the industry, but before its execution it would be known by taxi operators and that amounted to 
be a fruitless exercise if the police continued with that operation. Taxi bosses or operators were 
killed in day light. Sometimes the killers were known and the people who had witnessed incident 
were afraid to give such information to the police because they feared for their lives, as some of 
42 
 
the police officers were the owners of the taxis operating in the area (Boudreaux, 2006:21). 
Witnesses were expected to give that information to the police that were part of the taxi industry. 
The low rate of conviction of perpetrators in the court of law resulted in people being afraid to 
report or give information to the police. Dugard (2001:25) alludes to the fact that there were 
many factors that might have caused the low rate of conviction – poor investigation, cover-ups or 
the docket had been tampered with, poor training, lack of resources and etc.  
Another case was at Empangeni taxi rank where 11 people were killed and the then MEC 
Sibusiso Ndebele established a commission whose tasks were to look into various incidents of 
taxi violence in the province, external forces, the involvement of police, government officials 
etc. Some of the recommendations by the commission were that all relevant taxi violence crimes 
be reported to the Director of Public Prosecution in order for priority to be given to their 
prosecution and progress in their investigation to be monitored. It was noted with concern that 
the interference by police officers concerned were hampering the prosecution of perpetrators of 
taxi violence. 
 
3.2.7 Vigilantism 
The taxi associations in the ranks created a community court and those who were caught doing 
the wrong things were punished. In Gugulethu the court was run by Eyona Taxi Association. 
Boudreaux (2006:7-8) indicates that it was difficult for the police officer to intervene when they 
saw the person being beaten up. Sometimes it was because they were few police members to deal 
with a rampaging crowd or that officers were using the same taxis to and from home and they 
knew where the officer stayed. If the member of the industry was involved in vigilantism, the 
police would be unlikely to intervene as they believed that taxi operators were heavily armed. 
Community courts were created where the associations could not afford the services of private 
security companies. 
 
3.2.8 Revenge 
Revenge in the taxi industry prevails. If a person was killed in one association his colleagues 
would kill other members of the other association to avenge the colleague who had been killed 
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and the taxi violence would resume (Duguard, 2001:21). Two taxi operators were killed and 
another sustained injuries on the drive-by shooting on the N2 freeway near the Queensburgh off-
ramp. The victims were returning from the Bellair police station where they were reporting as 
part of their bail conditions (Sapa, 2000). 
 
3.2.9 Security guards / taxi squads 
Taxi operators have invested resources in the development of the lucrative routes and business. 
In the absence of effective law enforcement they would create private means to protect their 
business; squad cars would be sent out to monitor and patrol their areas of operation. When an 
illegal taxi was found operating on the route, the taxi operator would be taken to the association 
to be disciplined sometimes by threats of violence (Boudreaux, 2003:20). The associations, after 
accessing the threats from the people who were taking over their terrain, employed security 
guards to protect the ranks and routes (Khosa, 1991:236). Different associations employed 
security guards for protection of their work. In towns most of the people who were operating 
from the same taxi rank were not from the same association. Security guards in the industry were 
neither good nor bad. When the peace was restored they continued and perpetuated the violence 
so that they would continue to be employed by the association.  
 
3.3 TAXI VIOLENCE IN KWAZULU-NATAL (KZN) 
KwaZulu-Natal in the year 2000 was dominated by a series of taxi violence in different parts of 
the province. The frequency of the taxi violence was better than referred to the previous years 
but it is happening. The taxi operators and the drivers were killing do kill each other fighting 
over the routes. The most problematic areas were Mandeni, Stanger, Folweni, Umlazi, 
Harmmasdale and others.   
KwaZulu-Natal in 1999 has about 17% of the national taxi fleet ranks with 19 860 registered 
taxis administered through 287 registered associations, about 20 000 owners and 200 000 
employees. The figure was higher than this, as a large number of taxis estimated at 13 000 were 
operating without an operating licence (Ndebele, 2001).  
44 
 
There were different associations affiliated with SANTACO (including Ubumbano, NLTA, Top 
6, Alliance etc.), the council that was established and held its first national congress in 2001 in 
KZN. All associations were fully represented. The government worked towards addressing the 
association’s demands and developments were communicated through SANTACO rather than 
each association (Fourie, 2003:42). SANTACO structures were starting from national, provincial 
and association level. In KZN, the SANTACO provincial structure interacted with the provincial 
government. Some of the associations (which were a part of the formation of the council 
SANTACO) believed that SANTACO was not representing them fairly and wanted to put their 
views or concerns directly to the government. 
The nature and the extent of taxi violence are similar across the country. Being a member of the 
association you need to abide by the rules of mother bodies, like payment of prescribed fees that 
will assist in the functioning of the association. According to Shaw (1998:18), there were 
dominant routes that were highly contested and that most of the associations liked to operate.  
The desirability of these routes led to the dispute between the taxi operators and associations.  
Mother bodies were the main role players in the functioning of the taxi associations (Boudreax, 
2006:23), because of the power they possessed over how the industry should perform.  
Politics had an influence on the on-going taxi violence because taxi operators were killed if they 
stayed in the area where there was a dominant political party, whether ANC nor IFP (Dugard, 
2001:12). Boudreax (2006:23) indicated that police involvement in the taxi industry made it 
difficult for the people involved, including the victims, to give information to the police as they 
then would become targets. There was a breach of trust between the community and the police as 
mother bodies resorted to having their own security guards or squads (Khosa, 1991:236). 
 
3.4 TAXI VIOLENCE IN STANGER 
Taxi violence in Stanger fluctuates: there was competition over routes between taxi associations 
that were operating to and from the area. Taxi operators and owners together with the commuters 
were killed in taxi violence. The involvement of police in the industry created problems as it 
negatively affected service delivery in policing of taxi violence (Dugard, 2001:25). The 
indecisive decisions by the government and the bias towards Maphumulo taxi association and 
Stanger taxi association erupted into violence. The taxi violence in Stanger was between 
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different taxi associations who were operating short- and long distances and who were using the 
same ranks and routes for business operation.  
Taxi operators or owners paid a fee to the association on a weekly or monthly basis, depending 
on the association. This money assisted in the day-to-day running of the association (Dugard, 
200:19). The association determined the fees that were going to be paid by the commuters on 
different routes.  One single taxi association was established for all associations operating at 
Stanger in which R50 membership fee would be payable annually as suggested by the Stanger 
Taxi Association. Violent confrontation and killings followed in protest over the demand of R50 
payment. Members of the industry and commuters were killed (unknown source). 
 
Khosa (1991:245) states that competition over dominant routes resulted in violence between 
associations (Sekhonyane & Dugard 2004:15).  Legal and illegal taxi operators killed each other 
in working and in protecting their routes (Khosa, 1991:241).  The violence between associations 
did not affect only competing associations but commuters were also killed in the line of cross fire 
(Boudreax, 2006:22) Sometimes the killing was deliberate as a taxi operator would be shot while 
transporting passengers to their respective destinations or inside the rank. Boudreax 2006:23) 
indicated that threats and force were used by the association to enforce their arrangements. 
In other instances violence was within the mother body, where those who were in power wanted 
to continue leading because as a member of the executive (Dugard, 2001:18) you were able to 
make more money than those who were operating the taxis. So the increase of resources in 
mother bodies resulted in the power struggle, as there was no accountability for the use of 
resources. The use of the hit squad was one component of the mother body that was vital. Hit 
squads were used for the assassination of taxi operators, bosses and commuters. Vehicle 
hijacking (Dugard 2001:18) also took place. There were a few cases that went to court and 
related to the dispute between parties in competition of lucrative routes. 
 
3.5 THE CAUSES OF TAXI VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The following mentioned below are considered to be the causes of taxi violence in South Africa. 
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3.5.1 Avenue to accumulate capital  
The African blacks in particular were disadvantaged in opportunities of getting employment; it 
was difficult for them to find employment in the cities. Those who were lucky to be employed, 
when retrenched or out of job, took their money that they had saved to buy motor vehicles that 
they were going to use as taxis in order to accumulate capital. The person would buy the vehicle 
and start to operate it in order to bring income into the household, without following the 
procedures to obtain a permit which would allow him to operate (Khosa, 1991:235). The taxi 
industry played a role in the South African economy by becoming a method of poverty 
alleviation because it generated business and made life easy for the commuting public while 
adding to the wealth of the South African economy (Boudreaux, 2006:5). The taxi industry 
quickly became the contested terrain over which black people fought so that they could 
accumulate capital (Sekhonyne & Dugard, 2004:15). 
 
3.5.2  Economic contribution 
The taxi industry played an important in the economy of South Africa. The business was not 
about only making profit but the industry has contributed to the South African economy by 
creating job opportunities for the people in the society (Boudreaux, 2006:7-10). Examples of 
such people were drivers who were transporting commuters to and from their different 
destinations; queue marshals being responsible for ensuring compliance in loading passengers, 
checking tyres and taking the complaints of the passengers and car washers etc. (Barret, 
2003:27). 
 
According to Boudreaux (2006:5-6), the taxi industry provided the opportunity for self-
employment and an entrepreneurial platform to build on and form other businesses. The industry 
generated wealth in the economy by providing inexpensive transport compared to the 
government service and improved the quality of life for poor South Africans by lessening time 
spent commuting. 
Taxi industry was the first opportunity for black South African to become entrepreneurs and self-
empowerment although it was difficult struggle, as the law were designed to protect white 
business restricting black economic activity by limited competition and supplying a steady 
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stream  of black customers (Boudreaux, 2006:15-16). Although there was segregation in term of 
Group Areas Act but the people who were the most contributor’s in the market were black with 
their labour, who had to travel from distance from locations or homesteads to town or industries 
in order to work (Boudreaux, 2006:16). 
Taxi violence was apartheid ploy to destabilise black people. Taxi violence was going to assist 
them in achieving their objective. Dugard (2001:9) indicates that regulations were used by the 
apartheid regime to enforce racial segregation of transport and to protect the near-monopoly held 
by the South African Transport Service’s (SATS) subsidy of rail and bus industry.  
People going to and from town for different needs required supplied transportation. Many people 
in the community longed for the opportunity to be in the business of transportation. Taxis were 
the most commonly used form of public transport and played a critical role in the lives of the 
majority of commuters, particularly in poor black communities (Barret, 2003:1). The taxi 
industry contributed positively to employee productivity and industrial relations. If there was no 
transport to take people to and from work, such a situation would have impacted negatively on a 
country’s economy. Barret (2003:11) stated that although the contribution of the taxi industry to 
the South African GDP in terms of the turnover was not known, presumably because of the 
nature of the industry, it played an important role in the economy. Black economic activities 
were severely restricted by government making most black taxi services illegal (Boudreaux, 
2006:24). 
 
3.5.3  Deregulation and regulation processes 
African people took an opportunity to partake in the taxi industry as it was deregulated by the 
apartheid regime. People who were able to buy taxis bought them and started to work, which 
created a conflict amongst the taxi operators because of the greater competition over the routes. 
According to Dugard (2001:3), rapid deregulation resulted in the immediate rise in the number of 
taxi associations, which had used exploitation to build lucrative empires-cum-protection-rackets 
directly associated with violence from the beginning.  
Policies were derived as a result of commissions targeting how the transport industry should be 
deregulated. Associations conflicted with each other, which perpetuated violence. Policy 
confusion enabled taxi owners to enter the industry (Barret, 2003:7). Taxi associations created 
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rights over the routes and the government was confused whether to recognise those rights as its 
policies promoted conflicts over the routes by creating ambiguities over rights to operate 
(Boudreaux, 2006:24).  
The transport policy of the outgoing apartheid regime was established in which the 16-seater was 
legalised. The South African Black Taxi Association warned that too many taxi operators would 
enter the market and chaos would be imminent. Ignoring the call the ‘buy one get one free’ was 
launched, which led to the taxi industry being swamped with aspirant operators. 
The flexibility in the industry resulted in the taxi operators sharing the same routes and now the 
industry was characterised by exploitation and aggressive competition between operators 
attempting to poach passengers and ply the same routes (Sekhonyane & Dugard, 2004:15). The 
owners gathered together and formed the associations in order to regulate how the taxis were 
going to function in the absence of state regulations. Taxi associations used their strength to 
extract income through the use of violence by protecting their areas and not allowing others to 
work. The refusal of a taxi association for another association to work on the same route 
prompted violence because the other operators were unemployed and had no other source of 
income. Taxi violence between the associations was ignored, allowing them to expand and 
proliferate unchecked as it had been encouraged by the apartheid regime; taxi violence spread all 
over the country in the final years of apartheid (Dugard, 2001:4). 
When the number of taxi operators entered the taxi business and obtained permits and then they 
found out that there was no business on routes where they were allowed to operate, they often 
poached passengers from other routes. This was evidence to suggest that in some other areas the 
taxi market was saturated (Khosa, 1991:248-249). The government was blamed for the violence 
in the country. The government was accused for issuing lots of permits without creating a 
necessary infrastructure. 
When taxi association had been established their terrain was protected and anyone who wanted 
to join the taxi industry had to obtain all the legal documents and apply for membership in the 
ranks as the terrain was secured. Applications were made to a taxi association for consideration 
and, if the association felt that there were adequate taxis at that rank, the applicant was turned 
down. When an operator made an application to a taxi association, it did not mean that the 
operator could start to operate (Khosa, 1991:241), if it was his operation that triggered violence. 
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The change of affiliation by small associations in favour of the more violent and financially 
stable associations caused violence as they wanted to be in better positions. 
Poaching of passengers by the drivers also led to taxi violence. If the driver was caught stealing 
passengers they were offloaded to other taxi or beaten up. The other reason for the drivers to 
poach was a target that the driver was supposed to reach at the end of the day (Sekhonyane & 
Dugard, 2004:15). There were no means to regulate the operation of the industry even for the 
owners, as the entire operations were carried out by the driver in term of the cash that was 
supposed to be given to the owner at the end of the day. As long as the expected target was 
reached for the day, the number of passengers loaded and offloaded was only known by the 
driver. 
The introduction of 35-seater vehicles including the driver (in terms of the National Road Traffic 
Act 93/1996) created a conflict amongst the operators as the ones who were using the mid-bus 
could make two loads with one trip, which was disadvantaging other drivers from reaching a 
target.  
Although taxi violence fomented during the late-apartheid period, it did not end with the demise 
of apartheid, unlike other forms of political violence that diminished or disappeared after 1994. 
Taxi violence actually escalated in the immediate post-1994 period.  
Many people were injured in the fight over the lucrative routes. Drivers for taxi associations 
accused each other of stealing commuters. There were peace initiatives but little was achieved 
then as violence continued to escalate. Six prominent leaders of the ANC were assassinated in 
the Western Cape in a period of less than a month. Taxi violence was impregnated with 
transition in politics between 1990 and 1994. Deregulation of transport contributed to the spread 
of taxi violence with underlying political motives. 
Official efforts to deal with the taxi industry were almost non-existent between 1987 to 1994. 
Police used their positions of authority to promote violence between associations and to 
destabilise black communities. In many areas police were implicated in attacks, which included a 
failure to disarm attackers or to respond to warnings of immanent attacks (Dugard, 2001:7). 
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3.5.4  Competition over dominant routes 
A competition between legal and illegal operators started. Those who held permits were only 
allowed to travel and pick up and drop off passengers at specified stops. Failing to comply with 
this was an offence and warranted prosecution. There were so many taxis and taxi associations 
that it was practically impossible for police to police all these areas effectively. Unfortunately, 
this state of affairs made it lucrative for these illegal operators.  
There was constant competition between operators; some routes were more lucrative than others, 
which brought about animosity between operators; disagreements arose as a result and infighting 
became ugly and fatal (Sekhonyne & Dugard, 2004:15). Those disagreements led to breakaways 
and before long the operators engaged in full-scale violence. Another reason for violence was 
when shopping complexes were built without foresight. People were required to work in these 
complexes and they needed to be transported, which also resulted in major competition between 
operators. 
 
3.5.5 Territorial conflict 
Territorial conflicts in the taxi industry were mainly associated with access to taxi ranks and 
routes. Fights usually broke out when drivers crossed the boundaries into other territories. 
Jealousy and greedy also perpetuated violence. The CATA-Codeta conflict at times led to the 
division between coloured and African communities and have fed to taxi violence. 
Taxi association has routes considered as their area of operation. There were those routes that 
were highly contested (Sekhonyane & Dugard, 2004:15). There were rumours that officials were 
also the cause of this confusion by giving the same licence to different associations or to the 
dominant association. In the Western Cape one of the causes of taxi wars was rumours of 
widespread corruption within the local road and transportation boards. Government officials 
were seen as siding with dominant associations in their areas, stoking violence between taxi 
operators by granting preferential licences to selected individuals or allowing only one 
association to ply a particular route.  
The overtrading and wide-scale illegal operating on certain routes was cited among the chief 
causes of taxi violence in the industry. In Katlehong the cause of taxi violence emanated on the 
dispute over routes between operators from the Germiston and District Taxi Association an 
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affiliate of SABTA and the newly established Katlehong Taxi Association. The conflict had its 
roots in November 1989 when the two associations disagreed over taxi operations (Khosa, 
1991:245). The Katlehong Civic Organisation tried to intervene but before the peace talks could 
take place between the associations the violence erupted which left many people dead, houses 
and taxis were burnt and other people were injured. The issue started between the two rivals in 
the taxi industry and developed into running battles between the youth on the other hand and the 
taxi operators by vigilante gangs on the other hand (Khosa, 1991:246). 
Taxi violence started a long time ago. The war broke out between legal and illegal taxi operators 
for their recognition in 1960.  The illegal operators would pretend to be passengers and boarded 
taxis in order to kill the registered owners from the back seat and this was called “death from the 
back seat”. By 1964, four legal taxi operators had been murdered this way (Khosa, 1991:241). 
There were many processes that the operator had to follow in order to obtain an operating permit. 
The application had to be sent to a municipality planning committee. Delays in getting operating 
licences on time caused violence, as other operators would operate illegally while waiting for 
permits and fights erupted between associations.  
Some of the associations established 'taxi squads' to police 'pirates' in their area of operation. 
According to Khosa (1991:236), the duty of the squad was to patrol taxi routes, and if ‘illegal’ 
taxis were found the passengers were forced to alight and the drivers escorted to the nearest 
police station where charges could be laid. If the 'pirate' drivers refuse to co-operate, the vehicle 
might be damaged and the driver assaulted. The squad members were compensated by taxi 
associations).  
Khosa (1991:239) writes that the taxi violence frequently erupted among operators within the 
same organisation who all wanted to contest the same terrain. In Alexandra the violence erupted 
because of the split in an association and another group opened its own association. The new 
association then claimed the use of the same routes and ranks as they were part of the association 
(that they had split from) and other people became casualties of the situation. The fight was over 
the supremacy of routes and ranking rights. Most of the drivers were armed with all sorts of 
weapons, including sophisticated weapons such as AK47s (Khosa, 1991:244). The fights over 
ranks were also happening in certain areas where associations were fighting over the ranking 
bays. The Witwatersrand Council of Churches Task Force conducted a report and in their 
findings they blamed the police and local town council for fuelling and diverting the conflict in 
order to legitimise their power base (Khosa, 1991: 47).  
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Taxi associations establish their own ranks and routes with the assistance of local state officials, 
operators were expected to respect in order to protect their work. Khosa (1991:248) states that 
the fights were over lucrative routes as the association regarded them as their exclusive territory; 
this was evident by the violence that erupted in Germiston-Edenvale in fights over routes (Sapa, 
2010:9); by the greater Germiston Taxi Association and the Lethabong Taxi Assocation.  
The illegal operation of pirates ended up in taxi feuds as pirates were not restricted by the 
regulations laid down by the existing taxi associations, who often operated freely anywhere. 
'Pirate' operators frequently use a car hire permit system and declared certain routes their 
territory (Khosa, 1991:249). Taxi operators joining the association have to go through an 
internship system. If a new operator was joining the association he/she had to abide by an 
informal hierarchy enforced by the existing operators, which ensured that new entrants got the 
least preferential treatment with regard to routes and rank space. Newcomers dissatisfied with the 
internship system often broke away and formed rival taxi associations with a claim to the same 
ranks and routes. One critic observed, 'regulating the industry has allowed for vested interests 
and corruption of officials’ (Khosa, 1991:249). 
Undercutting prices by some of the associations created conflict. Some association used the 
strategy of lowering fares in order to attract more passengers. In Port Elizabeth one association 
lowered its taxi fares as a way of giving back to the community, which angered other association 
and led to the taxi feuds. The leaders in the Eastern Cape intervened in the matter and the peace 
accord was signed but the fighting continued unabated. Civil and political associations 
threatened actions against the taxi operators unless they stopped the feuding. This led to the 
establishment of a monitoring committee consisting of commuters and taxi drivers (Khosa, 
1991:249-250). 
The government has made many attempts to stop crime and taxi violence as it occurs today by 
keeping prices up and competition. There were claims that there was an increasing number of 
white ownership in the industry, which caused more friction in the taxi industry. Those black 
operators who were suspected of fronting for whites were often attacked by other black operators 
In Pretoria in 1989 three drivers were killed in a feud between drivers of white-owned and black-
owned vehicles (Khosa, 1991:250). 
This caused some fragments of the taxi industry to feel aggrieved by to the perceived 
insensitivity of the government in implementing a large-scale public transport system that would 
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undermine the livelihoods of the taxi operators in the cities of Cape Town and Johannesburg. 
They accused the authorities of devising a plan without consulting the country's most important 
public transport industry about a plan that would have resulted in a loss of income for taxi 
operators. This led to the taxi strikes in 2009 in both Johannesburg and Cape Town (Serino, 
2009). 
There were certain steps that needed to be followed before the operator could acquire an 
operating licence. According to Khosa (1991:241), the acquirement of association membership 
was the first step and if the application was not considered the operator could apply to other 
associations for consideration. Taxi operators had to obtain a permit in order to operate legally 
on the routes. Although the permits were issued by the government, one of the requirements was 
that the operator must have a letter from the association that confirmed that he/she belonged to 
the association. 
If there were two associations working on the same routes, the government issued permits to one 
association and that automatically resulted in the other association operating illegally on that 
route. Dugard (2001:5) indicates that the pirate services by the aggrieved and the protection of 
routes by the legal operators resulted in violence. Disputes within an association resulted in a 
split of the association (Khosa, 1991:244), which resulted in the conflict of the two 
organisations. 
As early as 1991, down town in Stanger, there was a big rank and most of the associations used 
that same rank for their operations. There were disputes over the use and the control of the rank 
some of the associations wanted to take charge of the rank (Barret, 2003:11). The use of the 
same rank by the different associations created a big problem; they wanted to take charge of the 
rank and routes (Khosa, 1991:244). The dispute over the routes by different association led to the 
violence and the assassination of the taxi bosses and operators (Boudreaux, 2006:22). The 
association who had the right or the permit to operate a route was doing everything possible to 
protect that route from the rivals who also want to operate in the same route (Sekhonyane & 
Dugard, 2004:15). Operations over the similar route led to violence because the association who 
has the right to use the route did not allow the rival to take charge of over those routes (Khosa, 
1991:239).  
The leaders of the associations become powerful because of the resources that were invested in 
the operation of the association; a person in a leadership position would not want to vacate that 
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seat because there were more benefits than operating the taxi. The leaders made sure that they 
adopted some individuals to enjoy the gains so that it would be difficult for the people who 
wanted to remove them from their current positions (Dugard, 2001:21). The violence became 
about power base and control of resources and no more about the operation of the taxi and the 
routes. 
The uncertainties in the taxi industry was also caused by the introduction of Bus Rapid Transit 
(BRT) in which over 500 taxis were removed from their routes of operation to another routes in 
order to cater for BRT buses. 
The taxi violence in Stanger was intense in such a way that the then MEC of Transport Mr Bheki 
Cele established the tribunal on the dispute between Stanger and Maphumulo taxi association 
over the Danall route. The department ruled in favour of Stanger taxi association, after the 
findings by the tribunal that the Stanger association was the legitimate route permit holder. 
Minutes afterwards ruling the taxi belonging to Stanger association was shot at and many people 
died after violence erupted. The chairman of Stanger association, Nathi Khanyile, said they did 
not have knowledge of the tribunal’s decision and indicated that they were not given a chance to 
present their problems as the violence has been there for a long time (Zulu, 2005). In Groutville 
members of KwaDukuza hosted the braai after they opened the Silver Star car wash but it was 
alleged that they were attacked with AK47. The MEC Bheki Cele indicated that when he spoke 
with associations they were all willing to work together and said it seems as if the associations 
had no control and their members were resorting to guerrilla warfare. 
The continuation of taxi violence in Maphumulo and Stanger Associations led to the suspension 
of their permits until the matter had been resolved. In the apartheid government many permits 
were issued in order to cause chaos (Dugard 2001:11). The confusion about policies by the 
government promoted conflict over the routes and who had the right to operate those routes. 
Confusing policies were used to enforce the law that promoted violence instead of government 
recognising and enforcing the rights that were established by the taxi associations (Boudreaux, 
2006:24). Many attempts were made by the stakeholders to stop taxi violence but failed. The 
efforts by the department that established the tribunal to resolve the ongoing violence between 
the taxi associations failed. The causes of the violence were the taxi routes which were not 
clearly defined.  
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Stanger and Maphumulo taxi association having fought over the routes and sharing the same 
rank both employed security guards to protect their work (Boudreaux, 2006:20). One day a 
shootout took place at the taxi rank between security guards from different associations where 
nine people were injured. That situation led to local police and Crime Combating Unit being 
permanently stationed at the KwaDukuza taxi rank and along the disputed routes. According to 
the station commissioner, Snr Supt Mnisi, six civilians and three police officers were caught in 
the crossfire; it was not known who started the shooting and the provincial task team was 
requested to investigate the matter. The disputed routes were the N2 freeway, the R102 to 
KwaDukuza, the Darnall route, the Doesburg route and the R74 to Maphumulo. As a result of 
the violence, the routes were being patrolled by the police, the Road Traffic Inspectorate and 
KwaDukuza Community Safety (Newman, 2005).  
There was a dispute over the route between Maphumulo and Stanger taxi association, the matter 
was taken tribunal hearing where it stopped Maphumulo Taxi Association from using the 
disputed route. The tribunal found that there were errors in the association's application for an 
operating permit and gave the right to Stanger taxi association to operate the disputed route. 
Maphumulo Taxi Association took the Department of Transport to court (Durban High Court) 
and the court ruled on its behalf, concluding that Maphumulo taxi association would be allowed 
to operate the contested route pending a final judgement. Taxi violence erupted after the court’s 
decision and Maphumulo Taxi Association members had resumed operating in the disputed 
route.  Bongani Mkhize the chairperson of Maphumulo Taxi association indicated that there had 
been renewed threats of violence after the court decision (Sapa, 2005). 
The nature of the violence in KwaDukuza not only targeted the people in the industry but also 
those who held positions in the community. The investigation made by the police in the killing of 
the municipal manager Nathi Mthembu had not yet ruled that the killing was related to taxi 
violence (Khan, 2005:3 & Sapa 2005). Mthembu had received threats before he was killed. 
 
The security of the Mayor Sduduzo Mkhize was beefed up following the dead threats to ensure 
that no harm befell the mayor. In KwaDukuza area and surrounding areas the taxi violence has 
claimed many lives of taxi owners, drivers, commuters, police and municipal officials (Sapa, 
2005). The killing of Mr Mthembu followed by six other people being killed including two taxi 
56 
 
bosses assassinated by an unknown person. In 2006 Mthembu’s killers were sentenced by 
Durban High Court to life imprisonment (Zulu, 2007:01).  
The dispute between Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations revolved around the exclusive 
use of taxi ranks and certain routes (Khosa, 1991:244-248). The revenge between the 
associations (Duguard, 2001:21) escalated to violence. On November 14 2003 two members of 
the rival Maphumulo Taxi Association were shot in Kwadukuza and on the following day four 
taxi passengers died in a suspected revenge killing. A group of armed men ambushed a minibus 
taxi in Kwadukuza; they set the taxi alight and when passengers alighted from the vehicle they 
were shot at; two died on the scene, two trapped inside were burnt beyond recognition and three 
were rushed to hospital in a critical condition (Sapa, 2003). 
The taxi industry was left to ‘clean itself up’ through the assassination of problem individuals 
(Duguard, 2001:26), the key men known to have been behind much of violence that been 
eliminated, presumably by members of rival taxi associations. The government did not intervene 
in solving the problem, South Africans should obviously not have to rely on this method to 
eradicate the violence as it would continue to escalate. 
The violence in the taxi industry between the associations over dominant routes resulted in the 
killings between the associations.  
Khosa (1991:245) indicated that different association wanted to be in control over the routes and 
there were dispute on disagreement on how a taxi must operate. The taxi operator who had tried 
to make an application in order to join the industry was rejected and started to operate illegally. 
The operator would have been assaulted or the vehicle damaged by legal operators, who would 
use any means to protect their terrain from the intruders (Khosa, 1991:236). The illegal taxi 
operators would kill the legal owners in order for them to be able to work in the contested route 
(Khosa, 1991:241).  
Mostly in towns different associations were operating the same ranks and some of the association 
wanted to have the supremacy over the ranks and they would start to fight with each other 
(Khosa, 1991:239). Security guards were being employed by the associations to guard operations 
on the routes and to deal with the illegal operators for the protections of the ranks (Khosa, 
1991:236). The association that started to operate the route first protected their routes from the 
rivals by hiring hitmen to kill on their behalf. Boudreaux (2006:22) indicated that the war 
between associations and the rivals escalated and they were shootouts in the ranks, which killed 
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and wounded the innocent bystanders. Taxi associations used threats of violence and violence 
itself to protect their arrangements on the lucrative routes. 
The existence and the operation of the mother bodies needed members to affiliate to the 
association and pay certain fees in order for the mother body to be able work and every member 
of the association has to comply and contribute. If you were on the executive of the mother body 
you were able to make more money than operating the route (Dugard, 2001:21). That caused 
tensions within as everyone would like to be in the executive and enjoy fruits. The assassinations 
of mother body bosses were common; they killed each other so that they would be able to extract 
money as well as the compliance from others within the taxi fraternity. So the person in power 
wanted to remain there in order to enjoy the fruits of being a boss (Dugard, 2001:21). 
 
3.5.6 State subsidies  
The government disadvantaged the taxi industry as there was competition between the rail and 
buses which were subsidised by the government continuously. The taxi industry received no 
subsidy and it was therefore at a competitive disadvantage for taxis without any form of subsidy 
(Fourie, 2003:54). Taxis charged low fares and provided wide coverage across the city, often 
serving poor areas that got no service (Boudreaux, 2006:14). Bus and trains were expensive even 
though they received subsidies from the government, were less convenient and managed by an 
oppressive regime (Boudreaux, 2006:18). Bus boycotts emerged. 
The DOT amended the NLTTA and it was now the National Land Transport Act No.5 in April 
2009, which stipulated the transformation of the minibus-taxi industry and fast tracked its 
recapitalisation programme which had not yet been fully recognised.  
 
3.5.7  Government interventions 
Previously there were no permits before the regulation of the taxi industry but the government 
was using radius permits in order to determine the area that would be used by the different 
associations in Stanger. There was a dispute over the use of Darnell route between Stanger and 
Maphumulo taxi associations and the department had to determine who has the right to have 
ownership of the route (Boudreaux, 2006:21). 
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The government was reactive instead of taking proactive approach when dealing with taxi 
violence (Ngwenya, 2003:3). The government tried to intervene with the programmes in order to 
combat violence in the taxi industry, but the officials who were working for the government took 
advantage of the situation. They were the cause of the problem rather than the solution (Dugard, 
2001:27), by issuing the operating licences for different associations to work on the same routes 
and that caused violence as two or more associations had authority to use the same route. The 
leniency to other associations when dealing with their issues portrays the incapability by the 
government officials, which demonstrates the effect on taxi wars and facilitated the spread of 
violence (Dugard, 2001:26), by being negligent and corrupt. 
The officials took an advantage seeing the opportunity in the taxi industry and ended up being 
owners which was conflicting the interest. They issued fraudulent permits to operators in order to 
enter in the industry (Dugard, 2001:27). Full attention was not given to cases because of police 
involvement and police dockets were sometimes tampered with, the perpetrators were protected 
or poor investigation of the case was made. Problems were also related to the lack of resources, 
staff demoralisation, insufficient/poor training, low pay or police corruption (Shaw, 1995:49-50). 
In other instances police were implicated in attacks or were in other ways partisan to attacks 
(Boudreaux, 2006:21). 
Police officials were turning the blind eye in violation of law; as a result they were unable to tell 
who had legitimate right to operate on certain routes. The police were unwilling to enforce law in 
the townships where many taxi were allocated. Boudreaux (2006:21) states that some taxi 
operators literally got away with murder because of the failure of the police to work effectively. 
The ineffective law enforcement and complicity in taxi violence exacerbated problems 
associated with increased competition (Boudreaux, 2006:24).  
Corruption by the government officials was an enemy within as they were literally doing wrong 
things for their personal gain and never mind about the consequences or the damage caused by 
their acts (Minaar, 1999). Government officials together with police contributed to government 
failure to stop violence in the taxi industry as they both had ownership, or they were involved in 
crime themselves, which made combating of crime to be complicated (Dugard, 2001:27). The 
police were biased towards certain associations they had membership with, and they used their 
position of authority to undermine rival associations. 
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Associations would fight in front of the police but they would fail to intervene or to disarm the 
attackers. Even if information was given to them they would ignore such warnings (Boudreaux, 
2006:21). 
 
3.5.8  Increase in taxi fares  
The increase in taxi fares was determined by the association. The non-consultation of the 
commuters regarding the increase in taxi fares resulted in a taxi feud between the commuters and 
the drivers. Khosa (1991:238) indicates that in most cases the commuters become aware when 
the queue marshal requested them to add more money as the taxi fares had been increased. This 
was evident by IOL news (Zondi, 2006), which reported the toyitoyi and closure of the roads by 
commuters to show their anger. In Copsville (Pieternmaritzburg) more than 3 000 residents of 
the informal settlement gathered in the early hours of the morning as part of a taxi boycott over a 
R1 fare increase and sought an. The confrontation between the police and the community 
resulted in people being injured and others arrested.  
The treatment of commuters by the drivers led to the community boycotting the taxis. Some of 
the drivers swore and beat the commuters. The safety of the commuters was in the hands of the 
drivers with their roadworthy vehicles. The fight between the drivers put the lives of the 
commuters in danger. Khosa (1991:239) states that the general treatment of passengers by 
drivers overloading commuters together with speeding resulted in commuters boycotting the 
taxis. 
 
3.5.9 Revenge 
If one of the taxi operators or owners had been killed in the taxi violence, the colleagues in the 
association or family would want to take revenge against those people who had killed their 
beloved one.. According to Duguard (2001:21) “the former president of the South African Long 
Distance Taxi Association (SALDATA) Dickson Mampane was shot dead after a meeting with 
Jacob Ledwaba the president of the Lethlabile Taxi Association (LTO) who himself was 
subsequently assassinated; in what to be believed to be retribution for the murder of Dickson 
Mapane”. In Newcastle revenge between associations were common, Bhekizizwe Godfrey 
Mtambo was the taxi owner who played a leading role in the Buffalo Taxi Association was 
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killed. According to evidence, the person who was alleged to have sparked the killings and 
attempted murders in the Buffalo Taxi Association was Mtambo.. The killings were sparked in 
revenge for the murder of rival taxi boss Sizwe Mdlolo from Sizwe Taxi Association. Most of 
the murders were executed by the hired hitmen from outside the province between associations. 
 
3.5.10 Recapitalisation 
The aim of recapitalisation by the government was set to formalise the taxi industry (Sekhonyane 
& Dugard, 2004:17) by moving from 15-seater buses to 18- and 35-seater vehicles together with 
the introduction of electronic money collection (Barret, 2003:16). This move created a lot of 
disagreements between the association and the government (Fourie, 2003:42). 
When the taxi industry was regulated as per the recommendations (Dugard, 2001:22) of the 
NTTT there was an increase nationwide of taxi violence, which was suspected to have been 
orchestrated. The implementation of recapitalisation resulted in taxi violence where the 
individuals jostled for the positions before the implementation of the re-capitalisation 
programme which would see custom-built, 18-seater- and 35-seater buses replacing minibus 
taxis.  
Recapitalisation in some other instances slightly shifted the focus for the drivers to fight each 
other. Instead they united against the competition with the bus industry, which was given the 
tender by the government. Fourie (2003:42) stated that drivers embarked on series of protests 
against recapitalisation, fearing of job losses because of recapitalisation. Dugard (2001:17) 
indicated that the aim of the government in restructuring and recapitalisation of the taxi industry 
was the establishment of new friendly conditions in the industry, in turn also awarding transport 
contracts to them. 
 
3.5.11 Daily monetary target  
The owner indicated the targeted amount per week that the driver must make, and that created 
pressure for the drivers because if they failed to do so, the owner might dismiss him. According 
to Khosa (1991:248-249), drivers worked very hard chasing the target and ended up poaching or 
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loading commuters that they were not supposed to (commuters from other routes) and that 
triggered violence. 
The association had their own routes that were designated to them; drivers from either 
association would accuse each other of pouching customers and that resulted in conflict (Dugard, 
2001:6). One operator from other association went through the route of the other association in 
order to go to town and there were commuters on the way seeking transport to town. The 
commuters stopped the taxi unknown to and the driver was well aware that he was not allowed to 
do that. Assuming that he was not seen he took those passengers who had helped him to reach 
the acquired target by his employer but if he had been caught that incident would have erupted in 
violence between the associations as they would have been playing the same routes (Sekhonyane 
& Dugard, 2004:15). Taxi operators sometimes would do such an action deliberately because 
they wanted to fill their pocket first before meeting the owner’s target (Barret, 2003:27).  
 
3.5.12 Employment of security guards 
The insufficient visibility of law enforcement resulted in the creation of taxi squads in the 
associations and the government created incentives for taxi operators to take private proactive 
measures (Boudreaux, 2006:22). Associations were employing the security guards or from 
security companies or taxi squads in order to protect their territories, as the Stanger taxi rank 
consist of different associations. One would find different kinds of security companies or squads 
that operated the same rank (Khosa, 1991:236). Their presence in the rank caused tension 
between them. Their duties included the monitoring of the industry operation and overseeing the 
illegal activities by their counterparts, joining forces with other association to prevent the rivals, 
monitoring and patrolling the routes and guarding against the illegal operation of pirates on the 
routes (Dugard, 2001:20). Security guards were employed because the mother bodies had 
invested a lot in the lucrative routes and they needed to protect them (Boudreaux, 2006:20). 
 
3.6. Conclusion  
Taxi violence has shifted its form as previously it was politically motivated and also instigated 
by the apartheid regime; regulation and deregulation made it difficult for the taxi operators to 
obtain operating permits because of the pre-requisites which were not satisfied. Taxi violence 
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was perpetuated deliberately by the past administration to fulfil their political needs. The damage 
caused by the government resulted in the associations being established with the intention of 
protecting their work, terrain, operation of the industry and also hired security guards to monitor 
their routes and ranks. However, the taxi industry was not yet fully formalised in order to have 
strict guidelines on the functioning of the industry. Taxi violence was caused by lucrative and 
dominant routes where everyone wanted to have authority over the routes. Police involvement in 
taxi violence related more to corruption than to destabilisation. The establishment of SANTACO 
played a role in the working relations between the industry and the government, as it brought 
about a decrease in taxi violence. 
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CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the findings of this study. In this study a 
qualitative research methodology was used to collect data, in order to explore how taxi violence 
was policed in the Stanger area. The researcher used one-on-one semi-structured interviews to 
obtain data from the research participants. As the researcher mentioned in Chapter 1 when 
analysing data, the researcher scrutinised the answers that were provided by the participants and 
extracted similarities in them in order to find the frequency on the same answer by different 
participants. The researcher then took the total number of participants who gave the similar 
answer for the same question versus the total number of participants’ interviews and arrived at 
the percentage. The researcher categorised, interpreted and classified each piece of data 
accordingly (Creswell, 1998, in Leedy & Ormrod 2005:150). The researcher used the very basics 
of spiral data analysis, which is widely used in qualitative studies by breaking down responses 
from recipients, categorising the answers to further extract reality behind statement with an aim 
to further analyse it and get additional meaning. The table and graphs do not aim in any way to 
change the qualitative study to quantitative data, Tables and graphs are a way to get embedded 
meaning that lies behind statements. 
 
4.1.1. EMPLOYMENT COMPONENTS OF PARTICIPANTS 
Figure 1: Number of participants  
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• The interview was done to ensure that all people with relevant experience are interviewed. 
Participants were then asked as to how long they had been in their place of employment.  
 
Table 1: Participants work experience 
 
 
 
 
 
The data was then analysed following the spiral data analysis method, according to which 
the researcher read through the interview transcripts one by one several times to get a sense 
of what they meant. The researcher then jotted down a few notes that suggested possible 
categories or interpretations. General categories of data were identified and then each piece 
of data was classified accordingly. For example, information that belonged under the 
challenges facing the policing of taxi violence was grouped together under one theme while 
other information that belonged under the nature of taxi violence was also grouped together 
and so on. Consequently, a general pattern was obtained and a sense of what the data meant 
was made. Interviews that were collected are discussed below.  
The findings of this study revealed that before 1998 the taxi routes were not clearly 
demarcated according to which route belonged to which association between Stanger and 
Maphumulo taxi association. Therefore, the two associations used the routes jointly and had 
constant disagreements regarding which route to use and which ones not to use. In an 
attempt to regulate or demarcate the routes, the KZN Department of Transport in 1998 
informed Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations to register these routes and to use only 
the routes that were dedicated to them. Instead of these instructions creating a harmonious 
working environment between these two taxi associations it led to more violence among 
them. Detailed discussions on the findings of this study are summarised below in the 
paragraphs that follow. 
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4.2. CAUSES OF TAXI VIOLENCE IN STANGER 
During the research project, the following were found to be the main causes of taxi violence 
in Stanger, namely: the control of association funds on the basis of position, disputes over 
ranking facilities, fights over passengers, greedy fights over routes, jealousy, levels of 
education, misunderstanding over associations, no regulations, permit, remuneration on 
basis of number of taxis, routes and lack of transparency. 
Figure 2: Causes of taxi violence in Stanger 
 
 
Out of 33 opinions received the major picks of conflicts are three: 
1. greed  
2. fights over routes  
3. permits  
 
4.2.1 Greed 
The study indicates that greed was another element that trigged violence as there was no 
proper regulation in place to curb it. As greed came into play, the taxi owners in the 
industry wanted to have more money even if that was at the expense of the others in the 
association or eliminate opposing competitors. Such elimination of competitors would 
allow them to have more passengers that could be transported, and that would automatically 
mean the increase of loads and extra cash. Some taxi owners were influenced by greed so 
much that once they were granted permission to operate their taxis they wanted to have 
more taxis than the others on the routes. According to the ILembe Regional chairperson 
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are the affiliates) “the cause of violence is greedy amongst the people in the industry and if 
the industry can be truthful that might assist”. 
If the person became the chairperson in the association, he had more powers than any other 
member of the association; for example, the chairperson could have 20 taxis whereas the 
other members could only be allowed to have up to a maximum of five taxis. Both 
associations (Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations) had a norm that the chairperson 
could have more taxis than the others. Greed came into effect because other members of 
Maphumulo or Stanger taxi association wanted to remove the chairperson so that they could 
hold the position that would allow them to make a lot of money. Sometimes the people who 
were causing the conflict were the local taxi owners themselves; if you were not in the 
favour of the chairperson he could hold your taxi operation permit application whilst the 
people who applied after you had obtained theirs. The chairperson was the person who 
submitted applications for permits to the authority board in the department of transport on 
behalf of both Maphumulo and Stanger taxi association. He further liaised with the 
authority board officials in the department of transport on the progress of applications. This 
granted him the powers to manipulate the process as he wishes. 
 
4.2.2 Irregular conduct by licenced taxi owners 
In some other instances licenced taxi operators would collude with unlicensed taxi owners 
in terms of which licenced taxi operator would pass forward a taxi belonging to the 
unlicensed owner as his and use his/her licence to allow such a taxi to operate.  This kind of 
practice is known in the industry as “ukuteta”, loosely translated as “riding on the back of 
the other”. Problems would start once it surfaced that licensed taxi owners has put a non-
licensed taxi owner’ taxis on the route through ukuteta. The other licenced taxi owners 
would be annoyed and in most instances would forcefully remove the unlicensed taxis. The 
licenced taxi owners would feel betrayed by one of their own and would view him/her as 
being consumed by jealousy and greed. Incidents like this could end up in full blown taxi 
violence and perpetrators could be reported to the Department of transport through Mpimpa 
Hotline.  
Mpimpa hotline (Ross 2003) is the free hotline (0862211010) that was established and 
introduced by the department of transport in order for the people of KwaZulu-Natal to 
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report any irregularities that were happening on the roads. The reporting included also the 
behaviour of the drivers on the roads: unroadworthy vehicles; as well as any crime that the 
community wanted to report could remain anonymous. According to participant no 11(the 
police official from PTEU) this had assisted a lot because those who sometimes witnessed 
taxi violence called the Mpimpa hotline and gave information, which assisted in the 
investigation of crime. According to Ross (2003), “the police are now running the Mpimpa 
hotline on a 24-hour-a-day basis and say it has become an effective weapon against traffic 
offenders”. The use of this hotline was encouraged also by The MEC of Transport Mr S 
Ndebele in his speech on the KwaZulu-Natal Transport’s Annual Summit in 2004 when he 
indicated that “adopting a culture of road safety means that the public themselves assist 
road traffic authorities in rooting out anti-social road behaviour. Use the Mpimpa Hotline, 
Report bad driving, Report unroadworthy vehicles, especially public transport vehicles”. 
 
4.2.3 Pressure from taxi owners to drivers 
It also became clear that the taxi owners put much pressure on the taxi drivers by setting a 
high target or profit margin that must be reached at the end of each day and if the driver 
failed to reach such target he or she could lose employment. In turn the driver would use an 
intimidating language to get commuters to enter his taxi and other taxi drivers would try to 
oppose such acts by threatening the commuters not to enter the taxi. These actions would 
lead to an exchange of words and eventually to a fight. The insulting language that the 
drivers use is very intimidating that the commuters are even afraid to caution the driver if 
he was doing something wrong while driving. The consequences of talking may lead the 
driver to ridicule or even threaten to drop passengers off on the way or to hit them. This 
study agrees with Khosa’ study (1991: 248-249), conducted in other three South African 
townships: Alexandra, Soweto and Katlehong, which have shown that “drivers worked very 
hard chasing the target and ended up poaching or loading commuters that they were not 
supposed to (commuters from other routes) and that triggered violence”.  
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4.2.4 Inconsistent ranking fees and facilities 
In Stanger area the taxi ranks are situated at the shopping mall and the business owners 
there gave the left side of the parking space to Maphumulo taxi association to use as their 
taxi rank. In the middle of the parking lot, you will find a long-distance taxi rank owned or 
controlled by the municipality. Then on the right hand side of the same parking space it is 
the Stanger taxi rank. This means the long distance taxis (going to Durban, Empangeni, 
Johannesburg etc.) also operate in the same vicinity with local taxi  associations (in this 
case is Stanger and Maphumulo taxis). Initially there was no conflict between these three 
taxi associations.  However, when people understood that the Maphumulo taxi association 
had two starting points and that, according to Stanger taxi associations, should not be the 
case. This also led to negative emotions between the taxi associations and hatred towards 
each other since the Maphumulo taxi appears to have been more favoured than Stanger 
taxis. 
In terms of the ranking fees it was noted that there was money that was paid on a daily basis 
by the taxi operators when leaving the taxi rank with a load. The fee for Maphumulo was 
R120.00 for a taxi and for Stanger was R200.00. For Stanger and Maphumulo taxis the 
money was controlled by the chairperson. That money was called ibhakede (bucket), 
because the money was inserted into the locked bucket and there were people who were 
responsible to make sure that each and every taxi paid the money. Later on it was taken and 
given to the chairperson.  The said money was not accounted for anywhere and no one was 
allowed to enquire on how it was used, even the executive committee was not responsible 
for its destination. This secrecy regarding the use of the money led to frustrations amongst 
other taxi owners. 
As a result within the association the chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary, deputy 
secretary, treasurer and the additional members of the taxi board would be jealous of each 
other because everyone had an interest in the bucket. The money made by taxis operating 
on the routes; was nothing as compared to what was made from the bucket a day. The 
bucket was another causal factor of taxi violence between the two associations. If 
somebody was killed within Maphumulo or Stanger taxi associations those who were 
suspected for the killing would point a finger to the other association and the violence 
would erupt. The association (either Maphumulo or Stanger taxi association) will just take 
that as it is that their suspect was from the other association and they would want to exact 
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revenge. The people that were killed were not coming only from the opposition (rival taxi 
operators) but sometimes within the same association (Maphumulo or Stanger taxi 
association). These allegation and finger pointing of suspects were taken seriously by the 
taxi owners and without proof they would act on such allegations. 
 
4.2.5 The use of private security guards within the taxi ranks 
Security guards were employed and paid by Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations. The 
security guards were employed in order to protect the daily operations of the taxis and the 
owners. Security guards were working at the rank to guard the daily operations, sometimes 
to do patrols on the routes or give close protection to the taxi owners. The security guards 
were also suspected by some in the taxi industry to be the ones provoking violence. The 
manner in which these security guards behaved was suspicious to the police who alleged 
that the fact that they were doing whatever that was required by their employers (taxi 
owners) and they could even be used in the commission of crimes such as the shooting of 
opponents during the taxi violence. These security guards were also found to be 
disrespectful towards the police. Sometimes they did not want to take instructions from the 
police (such as when they were told about the manner that they should handle their firearms 
in public and not to point them to the public members). The study reveals that the manner 
in which the security guards conducted themselves in the taxi rank was not friendly, as they 
carried rifles in the taxi rank in the middle of the community. 
 
4.2.6 The use of hitmen 
The research findings show that 61% of people involved in the taxi violence are the hitmen. 
Figure 3: Parties involved in taxi violence 
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The police (participant number 11 from PTEU, number 4 from cluster and number 3 from 
detectives) in this study suspected that the taxi owners did not want their hands to be dirty 
or became arrested for the violence that had taken place in the area. Therefore they will hire 
the hitmen (known as izinkabi) to kill on their behalf. In most instances the izinkabi were 
people who do not live in the area but who will come and do the work on behalf of taxi 
owners or associations (either Maphumulo or Stanger taxi association) and leave. Izinkabi 
duties were to kill the members of the opposition (rival taxi operators) or members within 
an association (Maphumulo or Stanger taxi association) in order for the person or persons 
who hired them (izinkabi) could take over and have access in the industry affairs. 
According to participant number 10 (Police official) “the people who do the shooting 
during the taxi violence are rarely known to other taxi operators”. Dugard (2001:20), and 
Khosa 1991:232), agreed with this study when they alluded that the hiring of the hitmen to 
kill the rivals who were contesting with them in the same routes was a common activity by 
most taxi owners who wanted to hide their link to the murders. 
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4.2.7 Incorrect registrations of Routes 
Given the response from people interviewed, it is clear that Out of 99.8 % opinion with 
regards to understanding of taxi violence more than half or 50% of the respondents it is clear 
that at Stanger the dispute and fights is over the routes. Below please refer to table.  
 
Table 2: Violence resulting from incorrect registration of routes 
Dispute 
over 
routes    Misunderstanding   
Lack of 
Regulation   Administration 
7   3   2   2 
50 %   21.4%   14.2%   14.2% 
      
99.8 
 
Both Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations continuously claim the authority over the 
routes. One of these associations would claim that it was their respective taxis which were 
supposed to operate in a particular route and such claims would sometimes lead to violence. 
The ILembe Regional chairperson of Santaco (participant number 14) alleges that another 
problem was created by the registrar (the person who was appointed by the department of 
transport to work at the authority board where route permits were issued and the registrar 
was also part in issuing of permits). It was found that the register appointed was also a taxi 
owner; in 2006 he was approached by the member of Maphumulo taxi association under 
Santaco who convinced him to gazette the route from Maphumulo, Stanger and Tongaat. 
The registrar also managed to issue the second permit for Maphumulo without being 
gazetted. That gave Maphumulo to go to other places and return back to Maphumulo then to 
Stanger.  
The first permit that was issued said that Maphumulo taxi association must travel from 
Maphumulo to Stanger then back to Maphumulo. The second permit gave Maphumulo taxi 
association the right to travel from Maphumulo to Stanger then go to other places and return 
back to Maphumulo and to Stanger, which placed Maphumulo taxi association on the 
advantage. There was a dispute at court concerning these operating licences and that has also 
caused a division within Maphumulo taxi association because other member do agree that 
there was a mistake on permits but others were  refusing to accept that. Sometimes the 
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association would overlap or encroach on the route of another association. There were 
dominant lucrative routes that were profitable, where everybody likes to work on those 
routes. Taxi owners were able to make cash quickly and those routes were highly contested. 
Some of the taxi members (from Maphumulo or Stanger taxi association) would deliberately 
want to operate on the routes that had already been serviced by another association (either 
Stanger or Maphumulo taxi association). 
One of the police officers (participant number 7 from support) adds that after the DoT 
informed the Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations to register their routes “the 
Maphumulo taxi association wanted to extend their scope by deciding to cover Ntshawini 
area which was on the south of Stanger (two kilometres from town). The dispute started from 
there because Stanger taxi association wanted to own the whole of Stanger routes; hence the 
split of routes with the Maphumulo taxi association caused violence”. The police officers 
interviewed in this study (participant number 4 from cluster, number 12 from PTEU and 
number 2 from crime prevention) feel that DOT also has a hand in the cause of taxi violence, 
by awarding some routes that seems to overlap or bring rivals association across each other’s 
path. There were routes that were policed by Maphumulo taxi association, but according to 
the department those routes were originally awarded to Stanger which created a conflict. 
This is supported by Dugard (2001:5), and Khosa (1991:244), who stated that if there were 
two associations working on the same route, it means the government issued permits to one 
association and the other association is operating illegally on another’ route.  
Another participant number 10 (police detective) stated that “the authority board was the 
one causing the continuation of taxi violence because they were biased in terms of issuing 
the permits and it is difficult for the police to monitor the issue of permits as they are not 
conversant with the taxi regulations”. The authority board was not neutral when dealing 
with two associations (Maphumulo and Stanger taxi association) and it took years to obtain a 
permit. At one stage Stanger taxi association ceased their operations because they did not 
have route permits. The DOT had the authority that deals with issuing permits to taxi 
associations. The permits allowed taxis to operate certain routes demarcated for their 
association. These permits were not monitored effectively because some of the taxis did 
work without permits. Taxi owners who possessed permits would fight with the ones who 
did not have. Sekhonyane and Dugard (2004:15) state that it was common that the taxi 
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association with a route permit would do everything in their power to protect strangers from 
using their routes for financial gain.  
 
4.2.8 Leadership problems 
In Stanger there were people who were in the taxi business who were from the area of 
Stanger. With the maturing of the industry other people (including those in Maphumulo) 
outside of Stanger started to have an interest in the taxi business and, as a result, 
Maphumulo taxi association and Stanger taxi association started to work together. When 
the time passed by, rivals from Maphumulo taxi association started to remove the old 
people (first people in the industry) so that they could be in charge of Stanger. Most of the 
new people who were accepted in the industry were from Maphumulo and Maphumulo 
wanted to take charge of Stanger. 
Stanger was not a huge town and their taxis were not regulated in terms of how many taxis 
were supposed to work in Stanger. There was now a challenge that there were many more 
taxis than necessary. The taxi operators had a shift system that they were using where they 
took breaks (some would work in the morning; others during the day or in the afternoon) in 
order to allow others to work.  Some taxi operators would be greedy and would not want to 
take a break and that would cause clashes between them.  
The leadership of both taxi associations often come to loggerheads over the routes and 
ranking facility problems. Maphumulo and Stanger taxi association would, without sitting 
and discussing their problems, just resort to fighting. Some of the taxi owners themselves 
were also involved in the violence, as they were the owners of the taxis. Taxi operators on 
the other hand were involved because they were taking instructions from the taxi owners; in 
order to secure their duties they followed instructions. 
 
4.2.9 Lack of business management skills 
The ILembe regional chairperson of SANTACO alluded to the fact that taxi operators and 
owners were not educated about the business management part of the taxi industry and that 
created a problem. Such a level of illiteracy saw taxi operators and owners running the taxi 
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industry by force and violence, believing in solving problems with firearms. This study has 
shown that the lack of taxi management skills also contributed to constant violence in the 
industry.  
 
4.3 THE NATURE OF TAXI VIOLENCE IN STANGER 
According to participant number 13 from Public Enforcement Unit (PTEU), “when the taxi 
driver was killed in a drive-by shooting whilst travelling with the commuters, these 
innocent commuters ended up being killed when the driver was shot and lost control of the 
vehicle”. Once the taxi violence had taken place the scene of crime would be cordoned off 
by the police in order to prevent any disturbance so that evidence is properly collected. The 
road would be closed down and no one would be allowed on the scene of crime, except the 
police and emergency services to do the work.  If the people were killed at the taxi rank, 
there would be blood all over and it would be very difficult for the police to preserve a 
scene of crime because of the number of people in the rank and the scene of crime would be 
violated. This happened because there would be few police attending the scene of crime 
because of the shortage of human resources. Sometimes other taxi operators and owners 
would take off the cordon tape and disturb the scene of crime deliberately and interfere with 
or destroy evidence. The police officers (participant number 2 & 2 from crime prevention, 
number 10 from detectives and number 4 from cluster), indicated that “the family members 
of the taxi owner sometimes get shot at when the hitmen come to assassinate the owner at 
home, in that the hitmen  just shoot who ever who is in the house”.  
When the violence erupted it had a negative impact on both associations (Maphumulo and 
Stanger) together with the members of the community at large. People were shot at and 
others ended up being dead, their taxis were set alight or stoned, commuters became 
victims of taxi violence. Different kinds of weapons were used in commission of crime: 
panga, knives (See Addendum for taxi violence scene of crime).  
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4.1.3 The impact of taxi violence in Stanger 
Taxi violence has a devastating socio-.economic impact. The following sectors have been 
identified as the most vulnerable and easily affected during taxi violence according to the 
14 respondents that were interviewed: 
Community  Education  Commuters  Business  
General 
Transportation 
14 8 4 5 10 
 
 
Generally, it is perceived that during such violence commuters were not able to go to work, 
children’s learning and education were interrupted and general peace in the community was 
negatively impacted on. 
 
4.3.1.1 Commuters 
It was evident that taxi violence affected commuters the most because they were the ones 
who relied on taxis to and from their destinations, as they could not afford to have their 
own vehicles. When taxi violence erupted in Stanger sometimes taxis cease to operate and 
commuters became frustrated because there would be no public transport operating. The 
study shows that taxi violence had a tendency to spread from the ranks, to the routes and 
the neighbourhood especially where the taxi owners stays. Violence brought fear and 
anxiety as innocent commuters get shot when the fighting took place. Boudreaux (2002:22), 
shares the same view and argues that “The violence between association did not affect only 
competing associations but commuters are also killed in line of cross fire, or deliberately as 
sometimes a taxi operator would be shot whilst transporting passengers to their respective 
destinations or inside the rank”.  
The study indicated that the economy of Stanger was affected when there was violence 
because people could not go to work. Stanger was a central place for most of the 
surrounding areas for the people to get their needs as well as the departure and arrival place 
for all local- and long-distance taxis. There was no incoming or outgoing transport to 
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factories in town, shops, and industries and so on. Manufacturers were affected because 
there was no labour for the period of time and operation of the machine in those areas 
become a challenge. The ILembe Region chairperson of Santaco (participant number 14) 
indicated that “if the taxi violence has started everything come to stand still. If the 
association did not want anything they didn’t allow anything coming or going out of 
Stanger. Until they manage to solve their problem” There was a wasteful expenditure for 
vendors who were working at taxi ranks because they could not sell their products. There 
was a high likelihood that vendors would also be injured in cross fire. 
 
4.3.1.2 Family of members of the taxi owners 
Family members of the taxi owner often become the victims as well because if the hitmen 
came to assassinate the taxi owner at home they would kill everyone. Other family 
members also wanted to avenge their family members who were killed. The ILembe 
Regional chairperson of Santaco (participant number 14) stated that “when the taxi violence 
happened family members must move to the other area because of fear since mothers and 
children are killed for nothing”.  
 
4.3.1.3 School children 
During the taxi violence school pupils were left behind with their studies because they were 
unable to go to school. Schools in Ntshawini, Groutville and Stanger areas were mostly 
affected by the taxi violence, including Groutville High School, Etshelenkosi High School, 
Stanger South School, ML Sultan and others. The parents feared for their lives as they were 
unable to take their children to school because, they were assaulted by the taxi owners 
saying that they were now in the business of transporting children. Participant number 10 
(police officer) from the detectives unit stated that “if your vehicle was seen carrying five 
people it was likely that you would be stopped and told that you must take those people out, 
they did not care whether they were your family members or not and if you resist you were 
assaulted”. Children had to walk as they were afraid to get lift from other people fearing 
for their lives. Other modes of transport were also not allowed if the train had broken down. 
In one incidence Metro Rail organised buses to transport commuters to their destination. 
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The taxi association did not allow buses to use such routes they wanted their taxis only to 
operate in those routes.  
 
4.3.1.4 Fear of security guards 
According to a police detective (participant number 8), the community people were afraid 
of the taxi violence. Moreover, when there were security guards (employed by Maphumulo 
taxi association together with Stanger taxi association) carrying big rifles openly in fighting 
position driving around the residential area sang songs of fight. Residents locked their 
doors and gates because of fear as they did not know who was going to be attacked. 
Security guards even went to the malls or complexes with their rifles. The police from 
crime prevention (participant number 1 & 2) further add that “In one incident the municipal 
manager of Stanger was killed because he wanted to regulate taxi ranks which were 
privately rented and used by taxi associations, the office of the mayor was also attacked 
following the same incidence”.  
 
4.3.1.5 Political impact 
It appears that within Stanger there was no political element involved in taxi violence 
because even the politicians did not want to be involved in taxi issues because they feared 
for their lives. The local mayor together with the other local political parties refused to be 
involved in the negotiations concerning taxi violence. 
 
4.3.1.6 Crime prevention and investigation  
The investigation of taxi violence was often difficult for the police because sometimes 
commuters or eye witnesses were afraid to give information directly to the police. One 
police officer (Participant number 8) from crime prevention said, “Community members 
were not cooperative in giving the information because they were afraid that taxi people 
will kill them and did not trust police”. Another police officer (Participant number 13) from 
PTES adds that when the community does give information they prefer not to be known. 
The situation was not conducive, as commuters feared for their lives even if they witnessed 
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the incident taking place in front of them. Commuters would not give such information to 
the police as they feared being the next victims.  
When you asked other commuters about the incident they would only tell you that they 
knew nothing. It sometimes happened that positive information was given through 
anonymous calls because the caller did not want to be known and testify in a court of law. 
Participant number 10 a police officer from detectives indicated that “it was hard to 
register informers because there was no one who wanted to be associated with taxi 
violence”. 
 
4.4 THE STRATEGIES USED TO POLICE TAXI VIOLENCE IN STANGER 
The study shows that the methods of policing used to deal with taxi violence in Stanger 
were ineffective on many different fronts, for reasons such as: lack of police visibility; lack 
of crime intelligence; lack of community cooperation and ineffective and allegedly 
conflicted local police. In what follows the strategies used by different law enforcement 
stakeholders are discussed. 
 
4.4.1 Public Transport Enforcement Unit (PTEU) 
The strategy that was used by the law enforcement was reactive; PTEU waited for the 
incident to take place before they acted on it. When cases were reported at Stanger police 
station the police would go out to attend such incident. PTEU would be informed by the 
department of conflict management team that the violence had erupted and that was when 
they would call the forces to go and attended to the situation. 
The police officer (participant number 12 and number 11) from PTEU indicated that “when 
the incident has been reported to PTEU, members are briefed of the incident that had took 
place proceed to Stanger to police taxi violence. Upon their arrival in Stanger they do 
roadblocks and try to target the source of the violence”. That was the first step whereby 
PTEU checked that all taxis making use of such routes had operating licences to operate 
those specific routes. All illegal operators found without valid documents were arrested and 
their taxis were impounded at Groutville.  
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Another members of the police (participant number 11, number 12 and number 13 all from 
PTEU) interviewed in this study add that “once we arrive in Stanger police  operate on 
both areas without taking sides by enforcing issue of permits on the routes. What we do we 
impound the vehicle driven by the normal driver and we ask the driver to call the owner 
because there is an act that we are using called National Land Transport Act 5 2009 
(NLTA) it allows us or give us powers to arrest the operator at this stage”. The study 
showed that it was not only taxi operators who got arrested but taxi owners were also 
arrested together with their taxis impounded. Another police officer (participant number 11 
and number 12) from PTEU adds that “usually this task is a combined roadblock with SAPS 
whilst we are busy with the operator asking permits and other staff and the SAPS members 
are busy searching the taxi and the luggage of the passengers for illegal firearms and 
staff’’. The passengers’ list with name, surname, address and the amount paid on the other 
hand was completed by all passengers in the taxi. That passenger list was used as evidence 
in the court of law in order to show that the taxi was operating the route for reward and that 
evidence was included in the case docket that had been opened against the operator at the 
station. 
The study shows that with PTEU being in the Stanger/Maphumulo area doing policing of 
taxi violence reduced the profit margin for the taxi owners because their taxis were not 
operating as usual. Some of the taxis did not have permits and taxi owners were afraid that 
taxis would be impounded if found on the route. Therefore the taxi owners decided to park 
their taxis at home until PTEU left the area before their taxis could start to operate. When 
the violence erupted and taxi associations did not want to co-operate, the department 
stopped the operations of the taxis. This affected not only the passengers but the taxi 
owners too because some other taxis were still paying car dealer’s monthly instalments and 
there was no other source of income. By their taxis not operating and negotiations 
suspended that brought them back to the table where they sat with the MEC of Transport 
Mr Mchunu and resolved the issues at hand. The minute things got back to normal and 
money was rolling again they started to work against the resolutions and the situation 
reverted back to square one. Once a plan had been arranged with the local police to deploy 
the police members (from Public Order Police (POP) and other police stations) from 
outside Stanger, in the Stanger/Maphumulo area there was reduced taxi violence for a 
longer period of time.  
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It was evident that Mpimpa hotline was the tool that was established by the department so 
that members of the community could report any wrong doings, including crime in general. 
The operational plan to fight crime was developed between PTEU and SAPS for safety 
reasons but mostly with police officers from outside of Stanger. Once a plan was arranged 
with the local police the information leaked and the operation became unsuccessful. 
Briefing of police officers was done outside of Stanger if there were joint operations. If 
outside police officers were deployed in Stanger police officers were not allowed to travel 
alone. They travelled as a team so that whatever happened they would be able to overcome 
that situation together as law enforcers. 
The study reveals that PTEU had its own intelligence whereby it would send police 
officers, who were in civilian clothing and not using the state vehicles, for a drive around 
the area in order to give the details of the new routes that were used by the taxi operators. 
That was done because police officers who were going to execute duties were not from the 
area and they had to have advance information before going to the area. That information 
was used to clear the routes, especially of those taxis that were operating illegally. During 
operations by PTEU in Stanger their presence was felt by everybody operating legally or 
illegally. Taxi owners who were operating illegally had their vehicles taken off the road as 
they were working outside the prescripts of the law. Taxi owners operating legally with 
permits were suspended from operating the route if found that their vehicles were un-
roadworthy, so both of the associations (Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations) felt the 
heat. 
After the operations in the area PTEU did the debriefing in order to identify the shortfalls 
so that they would be able to rectify hiccups for future operations. The gathering of 
intelligence was very crucial because it guided the planners on the strategy that could be 
used to stop violence. It would further determine the type of equipment and manpower that 
could be utilised to deal with anything that could come up. 
 
4.4.2 SAPS 
The study indicates that police conducted operations where the visible policing commander 
would take command and control of any operations. Normally police conducted cordon and 
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search operations in the taxi rank, roadblocks in the routes and visibility in the area by 
doing patrols.  
It appears that there were no proactive measurers put in place or intelligence that was able 
to detect that violence might erupt. The strategy that police used when a crime had been 
committed was to call a backup from other law enforcement agencies. Police attended to 
the scene of crime and conducted proper investigations. An initial primary investigation 
was conducted at the scene of crime. The police collected as much evidence as possible as 
it would enable them to identify the suspect involved in commission of crime and to follow 
the leads during an investigation. 
Once the evidence has been gathered, police backup was requested from other areas to 
come and perform planned operations or assist in normal policing. Local police were not 
involved in such operations because it was feared by their external colleagues that they 
would leak the information. In one joint operation where local police were excluded 21 
suspects were arrested and many firearms were recovered. Firearms we sent to ballistics in 
order to know who were the owners and if the firearm was used in the commission of a 
crime elsewhere in order to link it. Local police sometimes were engaged on observation 
duties and sent their informers to listen to taxi operators or taxi owners’ plans in order to 
know who the perpetrators were.  
The operations were conducted and perpetrators arrested in their residential areas without 
disclosing the plans of operation to any members of local police. This approach was called 
the “disruptive approach” because everyone would be caught by surprise because of what 
had happened. One police officer (participant number 2) from crime prevention indicated 
that “the destructive approach differs on situations as to who coordinated the operation if it 
was coordinated at the station level the crime prevention head will take charge. If the 
operation coordinated at the cluster level the cluster crime prevention head will took 
commander of the operation”. In some other instances meetings were called where taxi 
violence issues were discussed. The operational commander set out the rules and orders, the 
duties that were mostly performed were roadblocks, stop and search looking for firearms 
and general crime prevention in and around the taxi areas. Crime prevention was the key in 
order to collect and record evidence whilst it was still fresh but the reactive approach 
affected the work of the detectives as they relied on the primary information collected at the 
scene of crime.  
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The study shows that there were taxi owners who were not involved in the taxi violence, 
who were against what was happening, but who also knew who the perpetrators were. The 
approach that the police used was to apply tactics of getting information from those people 
within. That approach was working because the perpetrators got arrested and the taxi 
owners became confused over how they got arrested because they knew that their secret 
was safe. Taxi owners were very clever; they knew how to manipulate the police (giving 
those bribes) and, therefore, the best way was to arrest them and not enter into any 
negotiations with them.  
The study also revealed that taxi operators behaved as if the transportation of commuters 
through road transport was their exclusive business. A case in point was when the train 
from Durban transporting commuters to KwaDukuza broke down. Metrorail was compelled 
to transport commuters to their destination, bringing buses as an alternative transport. The 
taxi people did not allow Metrorail to transport commuters claiming that they were the 
owners of the routes and those passengers must be given to Stanger taxi association; the 
police tried to intervene but failed in their intervention to negotiate and resolve the issue. 
Police officers from Stanger police station mostly followed the strategy from the POP if 
there were crowd management situation. The POP would take over the operations, because 
they were empowered to conduct crowd control and penetrate operations in the ranks. The 
police station gave backup. The resources that POP had such as armoured vehicles were 
more suitable for the situation and the environment. They had most of the equipment in 
their possession – shotguns, teargas, armoured vehicles, and stun-grenades and so on. 
Crime intelligence was used to gather more information before the situation got out of 
control. Crime prevention strategies that were put in place were effective in the short term 
but there was no long-term solution for the matter.   
Normal joint operations of law enforcement were headed by the Stanger cluster commander 
from SAPS. In most instances successful joint operations were done with the police officers 
from outside of Stanger’s policing area and the highest ranking officer of those officers was  
in charge. That operation became a success because most of the people who worked on the 
operation had no vested interest in Maphumulo/Stanger issues. Both law enforcers (SAPS 
and PTEU) concentrated on what they knew best. PTEU checked if the vehicle qualified to 
be on that route, the road worthiness of that vehicle, and SAPS concentrated on stop and 
search of people who might be carrying illegal firearms that could be transported or used in 
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the commission of crime. A vehicle was searched regardless of whether it was a taxi or not 
because small cars were used to transport people or the firearms that were used to kill and 
that was done in order to prevent crime from taking place. One of the police officials 
(participant number 8) from crime detectives stated that “there was a need also to bring 
vehicle expects on board during operations in order to check if the taxi were not stolen or 
changed”. 
 
4.4.3 Department of Transport (Authority Board) 
The study shows that the process of applying for permits from the authority board took a 
long time for the application to be finalised. The workload of the officials who were 
working at the Pietermaritzburg office (authority board) was responsible for the delays as it 
was the only office in the whole province responsible for permits. Fortunately, there was 
one office that had been opened in Empangeni region but it was not helpful enough because 
it catered only for the people who were residing in that region or closer to that region. The 
powers to issue the permit were still vested with the main office in Pietermaritzburg. 
Empangeni region would receive application forms, capture the applications and do all the 
necessities and when the file was complete, the file would be sent to Pietermaritzburg for 
final decision. 
The study shows that there was a conflict committee that was established by the MEC of 
Transport, Mr Willies Mchunu. The meeting was supposed to sit twice a month and include 
relevant role players from SAPS, DOT, legal, PRISA and other departments. Its purpose 
was to embark on a rigid operational plan on the implementation of law enforcement 
because of the conduct that was portrait by the security guards who were working for the 
association at the ranks and their behaviour was uncalled for. The way the security guards 
handled their firearms and dressed in civilian clothes made it difficult to know who was 
who. The unfortunate part was that the committee lapsed without fully executing their 
duties. 
The police officer (participant number 4) from cluster crime prevention indicated that 
“workshops on Firearms and Control Act 60 of 2000 and Psira Act 56 of 2001 were 
conducted with different security guards on how to conduct themselves. Administration 
fines were given to those security guards who failed to abide by the rules, R5000 fine were 
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given for the first offence and thereafter the fine increases by R5000 on every subsequent 
charge”. Even though workshops were done the conduct of security guards remained the 
same because of their attitude. These workshops were done only at that specific time but 
did not assist in reducing taxi violence.  
 
4.5 THE STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED IN ADDRESSING TAXI VIOLENCE 
ISSUES IN STANGER 
The success of policing crime depends on the cooperation of different stakeholders ranging 
from law enforcement agencies to community members. This study explored the roles 
played by the different stakeholders in the policing of taxi violence in Stanger as well as the 
level of cooperation that existed amongst the stakeholders. 
The findings of the study indicated that there were working relations between the South 
African Police Service (SAPS), Public Transport Enforcement Unit (PTEU), Municipal 
police, Security guards, Public Order Police (POP), Road Traffic Inspectorate (RTI) and 
Department of Transport (DOT) if need arises. If the violence erupted other units were 
activated to come and urgently assist. Public Order Policing (POP) coming from 
Empangeni, Durban or Newcastle and other stations coming out of Stanger area and 
emergency service units such as fire department, ambulance services, municipal police and 
security guards were called. By the time the different units arrived, the crime scene would 
easily be contaminated because local police did not have sufficient manpower on time to 
deal with such situation. In some other instances the police had to wait for backup before 
attending to the scene of crime due to the fact that they might be attacked. The police 
officers (participant number 1 and 2 from crime prevention and participant number 3and 8 
from detectives) indicated that “even though there were relations within law enforcement 
but it was hard to trust one another as police members because some of our police officers 
were alleged to be owners of taxis or they were having relatives who are in the taxi 
industry”. 
The study indicated that there was good level of cooperation amongst each discipline as 
they carried out their own functions. When there were planned operations the people in 
charge of these discipline had joint meetings where problems were identified, discussed and 
come up with a proper plan. The plan was therefore shared with members during briefing 
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on the day of the operation, given instruction of execution; sometimes there were individual 
or joint briefings. Joint operations were done by outside police in order to yield good results 
and briefings that were not done in the area. They only entered the area once they were 
ready to execute the plan. Everything become in order immediately when PTEU was 
deployed in the area because PTEU were the specialists in issues of route permits and they 
impounded all their illegal and un-roadworthy vehicles. The police from PTEU (participant 
number 13) indicated that “local police did assist outsiders (PTEU) in giving them the 
details of other alternative routes that might be used by taxis if they knew that PTEU was in 
the area”.  Once taxi operators knew that PTEU were in the area they would divert and 
change their directions and use the back routes that were unknown to the person who was 
not from the area. Those routes would mostly be used by illegal operators. 
The relationship between the local police and the taxi industry was conducive as they had 
known each other for a period of a long time, but taxi owners do not give information to the 
police. One of the police detectives (participant number 8) pointed out that “even though 
they differ with taxi association but there were those working relations. The chairpersons of 
the associations were cooperative if may be there was a taxi owner or the driver that 
committed crime and the case had been opened the police would call the chairperson and 
the suspect will be brought to the station by the taxi owners”. Other police officers 
(participant number 3, number 6 and number 8) from detectives also confirmed there were 
people within the Maphumulo or Stanger taxi association who do not want taxi violence 
and they are sometimes cooperative with the police in few cases. If they knew the suspect 
that was requested by the police, they also made that person available for the police and the 
police affect an arrest. It was also noted that in other instances the relationship between the 
local police and the associations was ruined by police officer from outside Stanger (such as 
PTEU) who would come, make arrests and then leave the area. Once the PTEU has left the 
taxi associations would start to have negative attitude towards local police and the level of 
trust would decrease. The local police had to start afresh in trying to mend relations with 
Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations. The findings of the study indicated that the 
working relations between the local police and other law enforcement agencies coming 
from outside to intervene were good. There was mistrust when it cames to performing the 
planned operation because they were afraid that the local police would leak information.  
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Municipal police seemed to be reluctant to involve themselves in taxi-related issues. The 
local municipality had a role to play pertaining to the issues of bylaws and traffic laws that 
needed to be sorted out. In Stanger there were five different security companies and they 
did assist if requested to do so. These security guards were entrusted with security duties at 
the taxi rank and they posed a danger to the community. Psira who supposed to deal with 
transgression of security guards in terms of the Psira Act 56 of 2001, as the custodian and 
the regulation authority board, was failing to do its work, and showed interest in executing 
Psira duties as they were not taking actions against security guards who did not adhere to 
the Act.  The police officer (participant number 8) from detectives indicated that “in some 
other instances Business against Crime did became part of the meetings held with 
stakeholders in order to find solution”.  
The DOT deployed officials in the area when taxi violence had erupted in order to resolve 
conflict. When the government official arrived in the area they just gave instructions that all 
those who did not have permits be arrested. The delays in finalising permit application by 
the DOT resulted in a situation where taxi owners would show the local police the proof of 
application which was dated two years previously and was still pending finalisation. Such 
situation caused a burden for the local police as trust between between them and taxi 
industry diminished.  
The police officer (participant number 1) from crime prevention indicated that “there was a 
team which was established by Department of Community Safety and Liaison (DoCSL) for 
negotiations. It included all stakeholders (SAPS, PTEU, Municipal police, and taxi 
associations & RTI); the officials from Department of Community Safety and Liaison were 
leading negotiations. The taxi monitor from Stanger municipality was responsible to liaise 
with the taxi industry and coordinate meetings”. The taxi monitor was ineffective in 
executing duties because the committee ceased to operate. The taxi monitor was supposed 
to be in constant contact with taxi associations (Stanger and Maphumulo taxi associations) 
and called meetings on a monthly basis but failed to do so and that was the end of that 
structure. DoCSL were residing in their Head Quarters in Pietermaritzburg and they would 
only come to attend the meetings. The commitment of stakeholders was weak and that was 
ruining the stakeholder relation that was going to be able to open doors for negotiations and 
understanding with taxi industry. 
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4.5.1 Meetings conducted to resolve taxi violence 
The finding of the study shows that the MEC of Transport Mr Willies Mchunu was calling 
meetings with both Maphumulo and Stanger associations if violence had erupted. Police 
were the secondary role player to ensure safety and security of the citizens. According to 
one of the police officers (participant number 4) from cluster crime prevention, “meetings 
didn’t yield good results because the incidents continued to take place and there were no 
long-term solution to the problem”. Another police officer (participant number 1) from 
crime prevention indicated that “taxi associations were not negotiating in good faith 
because resolutions taken in the meetings were not implemented , instead the people 
continued to die whilst negotiations were still in motion. In other instances after the 
negotiations it was quiet for few weeks and then started again”. 
The then MEC of Transport Bheki Cele established the forum where all role players (SAPS, 
traffic, municipality police etc.) were supposed to meet and deal with the issues in order to 
prevent violence. The forum had few meetings but could not continue with the work for 
unknown reasons. The person who was appointed to be in charge of the forum was the 
person responsible for security matters at Stanger municipality. The ILembe Regional 
chairperson of Santaco (participant number 14) indicated that “there was Operation 
Hlokomela where Santaco, municipality, SAPS KwaDukuza and Maphumulo have joint 
operations and that assisted a lot and motor vehicles found doing wrong were given 
warnings”.  
The study indicated the intervention by the MEC of Transport Mr Willies Mchunu allowed 
the participation of taxi associations in meetings called by the local police at station. Those 
meetings allowed working relations between the police and the taxi associations. The police 
were then able to consult and share information with the chairperson of the taxi association 
if need be. In the meetings that were called by the MEC of Transport the invitation was 
extended to the traffic officers, the mayor, together with councillors in order to find a 
solution to the matter.  
The police officer (participant number 5) mentioned that, “when there were meetings both 
associations were given a chance to voice their views in one meeting because if a meeting 
was held with one association it tended to say that the police are biased”. Sometimes 
meetings with Maphumulo and Stanger taxi association yielded good results and sometimes 
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there were unproductive. In other instances the meeting convinced that there was an 
understanding on the issue at hand but at a later stage the complaint of another incident of 
taxi violence that had just been committed would be received. The leaders of both 
Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations were very cooperative when invited to attend the 
meetings. They came accompanied by their bodyguards and security but the attacks on the 
other hand continued whilst meetings were held. Police officer (participant number 8) from 
detectives echoed the same sentiments that “even though, meetings took place but it seemed 
as if true resolutions were not disseminated to the members of the associations correctly as 
per the engagements. In one of the meetings in their engagements they agreed on the routes 
that were going to be utilised by the other association but few weeks down the line they 
went against their decision”. Agreement after discussions seems to yield good results but 
taxi owners would revert back to the same problems and there was no permanent solution to 
the taxi violence issues.  
The chairperson of Santaco ILembe Region (participant number 14), indicated that they 
always reported to the police when they were having meetings, which combined both of the 
parties (Stanger and Maphumulo taxi associations) in order to prevent the violence that 
might take place. Some of the meetings were held in the presence of police because of fear 
that they might end up fighting inside the meeting. This also assisted in relations because 
the police wanted to share something with the both leaders of Maphumulo and Stanger taxi 
association. However, that did not reduce the rate of taxi violence in Stanger.  
 
4.6 THE CHALLENGES FACING THE POLICING OF TAXI VIOLENCE IN 
STANGER  
The study reveals that the challenges were are encountered by the police hindered the 
implementation strategies that were used in order to police taxi violence. Among others was 
shortage of human and physical resources, alleged conflicted relations of local police with 
taxi association, poor performance of policing and proper investigation of cases that had 
been reported. What follows are the challenges that were faced by the police in execution of 
their duties in details: 
 
89 
 
4.6.1 Manpower 
The study revealed that shortage of manpower was a challenge that brought unsafe 
environment where police officers were working. Crime prevention strategies in Stanger do 
take place but the police who were performing such strategies were not sufficient. If 
violence had erupted everyone was posted at the taxi rank and policing of crime in general 
would be compromised. The police officers (participant number 3, number 6, number 10 
from detectives; number 4 from crime prevention and number 9 from support) indicated 
that “ If there was enough manpower it would be easy to post members in different posts to 
do observation, random searches, stop and search, static at the ranks and others to perform 
normal patrols on rotational basis”. Another police officer (participant number 10, number 
4 from crime prevention and number 11 from PTEU) revealed that “police work was 
affected in terms of the manpower because the community of Stanger had increased a lot 
and the manpower ratio was very low compared to the community they serviced”.  
 
4.6.2 Resources  
The police (participant number 1,2 & 5 from crime prevention, number 10 from detectives, 
number 4 from cluster and number 13 from PTEU) also complained of limited resources 
(such as armoured vehicles) to utilise when attending to taxi violence cases. Sometimes 
when the violence had erupted at the taxi rank it was difficult for the members to 
immediately attend to such a complaint. The armoured vehicles assisted when attending to 
such incident by protecting victims and police officers from being hurt. The police 
armoured vehicles were stationed at Empangeni, and POP members were the ones who 
would come with them if they were called. Local police members were deployed to be 
static at the rank. They were supposed to stay there for the duration of their shift and use 
soft-top vehicles, which were not suitable for the situation because a bullet could easily 
penetrate.  
The police officer (participant number 4) from cluster confirmed that: “you cannot restore 
order easily, you cannot cordon off scene of crime properly, there were lots of taxis moving 
between different associations, there were lots of movements of people, lot of aggression 
and it was total chaotic with small capacity of police that we had. It was difficult to control 
the cordon scene of crime and preservation of it. Taxi people would deliberately break off 
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the cordon and question why do you cordon here, you must go and cordon there”. In a few 
cases the taxi members were cooperative but it seems like mostly they were not 
cooperative. 
 
4.6.3 Information / witness 
The findings of the study indicated that case dockets were opened for the crime committed 
during taxi violence but were mostly closed undetected. Cases were closed due to 
insufficient evidence obtained because people who witnessed the incident were afraid to 
give information to the police. For example, police officers (participant number 13 from 
PTEU, number 4 from cluster, number 1 & 2 from crime prevention and number 3, 6 & 8 
from detectives) mentioned that “Community members were not cooperative in giving the 
information because they were afraid that taxi people will kill them and did not trust 
police”. That proves that the society was scared, and if it happened that they give you 
information they may not submit sworn statements or even to testify at court. The challenge 
was that many cases were thrown out of court because of insufficient evidence and the 
perpetrators walked free. 
 
4.6.4 Conflict relations  
According to the police officer (participant number 1 and 2) from crime prevention, 
“policing of taxi violence in Stanger was a challenge because some of police members were 
related to taxi owners in different relationships”. The information of police reached quickly 
to taxi owners but in return they did not get any information from them, which threatened 
planned operations. Another member of the police (participant number 2 from crime 
prevention) made an example that “information leaked at the planning session where 
information was disseminated concerning the road block or an operation that was going to 
take place in R74. When the operation resumed they didn’t find any illegal taxis using that 
route it meant that they got information at hand and there were no successes made”. The 
police officer (participant number 10) from detectives confirmed that: “you cannot leave 
aside that police officers who were working at Stanger were well known by taxi owners, in 
both associations and they have relatives who owns taxis. Definitely sure what ever 
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strategy that will be put in place will fail, but with the deployment of outside police to work 
in the area for a period of time it assisted. When members of the station were posted to go 
and work at the rank, few will agree to the call but others will be reluctant and they would 
indicate by body language that they don’t like to work there”. 
Taxi owners appeared to be well connected with police, Justice Department, and have 
relations or friends with prosecution, which also posed a challenge when it came to 
convictions. Some of police members booked off sick when there was taxi violence because 
of fear from their colleagues as they did not trust each other. With the taxi industry resumed 
it resulted in more shortages of the little manpower that the police station had. According to 
the police officer (participant number 8) from detectives, “some members were afraid to 
perform duties whole heartedly because they were afraid of victimisation as some of station 
managers own taxis and others had relationship with taxi owners, most of managers and 
their relatives were involved in the taxi business”.  
The police officer (participant number 4) from cluster crime prevention revealed that “local 
police were known to taxi associations as there were working at the station for many 
years”. Local police were often reluctance to enter at the rank or to be involved in taxi 
violence issues, because taxi people had been threatening the police on many occasions and 
made accusations. In some instances when there were shooting at the rank you would find 
that sometimes a police officer would be  posted on static alone, and you do not get urgent 
support from the police station if you need assistance as they were reluctant to work taxi 
related crimes. The challenge was that police officers were known by the taxi owners and 
feared for their lives as there was a policeman killed in 2004, he and his family were 
involved in taxi business and it was suspected that he was killed by taxi owners or 
operators. That meant it was risky for the local police to attend the taxi violence within their 
area. 
 
4.6.5 Security guards 
Both Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations at the rank had their own security guards. 
When the violence erupted security guards ended up shooting each other at the taxi rank 
and there would be firing crossing between both security guards. One of the police officer 
(participant number 8) from detective’s indicated that “most of the taxi people were armed 
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and it was very difficult to deal with them because they had armed security guards”. 
Security guards employed by Maphumulo or Stanger taxi associations were fully equipped 
and carry big guns; terrorised. If it happened that a private vehicle collided with a security 
guard vehicle they took the car and impound it at the rank, claiming large sum of money 
exercising their powers. The police officer (participant number 7) from support revealed 
that “at one stage security guards came into the police station, carried guns in their hands 
and shots were fired”. One of the police officers (participant number 1, 2 & 5 from crime 
prevention, number 3 & 6 from detectives and number 4 from cluster) support that 
“Security guards did not have respect in the police or the police station; they even cocked 
their firearms in front of the police station”.  
The involvement of the firearm in a scene of taxi violence seemed to be a huge challenge 
that would only be detected if security guards’ firearms were confiscated and taken to 
ballistics in order to check whether they were involved in any crime or not. That is when it 
would be detected that the firearm was involved in commission of crime but it would be a 
difficult mission to know who used such a firearm to commit crime, as it would already 
have exchanged many hands. Security guards booked firearms at the duty room when 
reporting for duty and handed the firearms back when they reported off duty. The security 
guards that would be booking on duty relieving security guards booking off duty would be 
issued with the same firearms that were issued to the previous security guard. Firearm tests 
would be done after every six months in order to check if there if there any firearms 
involved in the commission of crime. If firearms belonged to the security company the 
challenge was that they were often not assigned to an individual but issued to different 
officers when reporting for duty meaning during the change of shift the person going off 
duty would hand over duties and the firearm to the person reporting on duty. 
 
4.6.6 Enforcement of the law 
The police officers (participant’s number 1 & 2 from crime prevention and number 3, 5 & 6 
from detectives) pointed out that “police officers needed to be assisted with laws that could 
be enforced in executing their duties in relation to taxi-related laws”. Police officers 
needed to be conversant with taxi laws because whatever strategies that they came with 
failed as there were specifications that they needed to check. If police officers stopped a 
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taxi that they supposed to know specifications and if not they would not hesitate to 
implement relevant laws. Another police officer (participant number 1) from crime 
prevention pointed out that “there were no direct laws that guided police in enforcing taxi 
regulations. It was difficult to police taxi violence because they didn’t have idea on what to 
implement on taxi related issues. Committed police officers were needed because the taxi 
industry had a lot of money and some officers may be easily influenced in enforcing the 
law and accepting bribes. 
The police officers (participant number 3, 5, & 6) from detectives indicated that “the police 
were not allowed to carry a rifle in public or anyhow except in compelling situations but 
the security guards used rifles in public spaces and did not take into account such rules”. 
On the other hand the community ended up not trusting the police because you would find 
the police officer carrying a pistol inside the holster and the security carrying a rifle on 
hand. That gave the ordinary person or an indication to the members of the public that 
security guards were higher than police officers. When police officers went to the taxi rank 
security guards were not even afraid to inform the police that they were employed to guard 
the taxi rank, they were performing their duties and would take orders from their employer 
only (taxi owners). As a result the police had limited access and powers within the rank as 
it was a private property.  
 
4.6.7 Private taxi rank 
The findings of the study showed that the municipality did not have control over the taxi 
ranks. That made the work of the police very difficult when it came to the policing of taxi 
violence in the ranks, as they were situated on private property. That also posed a challenge 
for police officer who were working at the taxi rank because they were working on private 
property and not public. The police officer (participant number 6) from detectives pointed 
out that “in Stanger there was no public rank which was owned or controlled by Stanger 
municipality”. Both taxi ranks were privately owned; Stanger and Maphumulo taxi 
association were renting property from Boxer Store owners. The municipality did not have 
a control over taxi ranks; in other words taxis were operating on private property as they 
wished.  
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According to the police officer (participant number 8) from detectives, the study reveals 
that “police were faced with armed people who had licence to possess firearms and had 
permits to carry rifles. So if there was violence at the rank you cannot send two or three 
officers to work at the rank. Since the police were not trained on how to identify taxis which 
were not permitted to work on certain routes and they did not even know what the permit 
was or what does it looks like, its features. They were not trained in identifying whether 
contracted security guard were wearing a uniform which conformed to prescripts or not. 
Police didn’t know jurisdiction for the operating taxis”. 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the above findings that the policing of taxi violence in Stanger was not an 
easy task for the local police. Hence the meetings and the strategies that the police 
employed are not fruitful as this issue continues despite the intervention of other 
stakeholders. The fact that there was no specific training that was dedicated to police 
officers in performing duties relating to taxi violence, routes and permits was also a huge 
challenge. Taxi violence did not affect only the people in the taxi industry as even 
community become the victims of taxi violence.  
  
95 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to find the ways and means that could be used to effectively 
police taxi violence in Stanger. From the findings it became evident that taxi violence was a 
huge challenge to the police in Stanger area. Owing to that this research proposes new ways 
that could be used when dealing with taxi violence in this area. The discussion in this 
chapter starts with the summary of the research findings, then the proposed 
recommendations, then the conclusion. 
 
5.2  Summary of the research findings 
 
• Objective 1: To determine the causes of taxi violence. 
The findings of the study have shown that there was competition amongst the taxi owners 
together with unequal treatment of the association members in determining the total number 
of taxis the person must possess, which led to greed and the inspiration of wanting to 
eliminate some other taxi owners in order to make more profit.  The powers that were 
vested in the chairperson of the association granted him the power to manipulate the 
process as he wished because process coordination was centralised to him. Fronting 
(Ukuteta) appeared to be one of the elements of jealousy and the cause for conflict as well, 
because taxi owners would want to be seen as having many taxis whereas some amongst his 
taxis did not belong to him. This impression of living a high lifestyle led to tension between 
the taxi owners. 
The high profit margin that was set by the taxi owner also resulted in the taxi driver 
operator neglecting the road rules in order to meet the daily profit target. The study has 
shown that the tension between Maphumulo and Stanger taxi associations came about when 
the Maphumulo taxi association appeared to be more favoured than Stanger taxi association 
because Maphumulo taxi association had two starting points. The daily rank fee that was 
paid by the taxi operators made the taxi owner aggrieved because there was secrecy 
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regarding the use of such money and it was not accounted for. Consequently, most of the 
owners wished to control such funds and that aggravated the tension between the two taxi 
associations. Accusations levelled against taxi by associations against each other was a 
norm if somebody was killed even though you may find out that, that person was killed 
within the association itself. They would do it in order to shift the blame as if the rival 
association had attacked them and they would pay revenge based on hearsay information. 
The study further showed that the manner in which the security guards conducted 
themselves in the taxi rank was not friendly; they carried rifles in the taxi rank in the middle 
of the community and they were disrespectful to the police. Security guards were also 
involved in the escalation of violence, when there was no taxi violence they had to be 
withdrawn from the area and they would deliberately start the violence so that they could 
extend their stay.   
The study shows that the flouting of system by the officials (Transport authority board) 
created a challenge which ended up with some routes given to different taxi associations. 
There were dominant, lucrative and highly contested routes in which most of the taxi 
operators wanted to operate such routes in order to make quick cash. Some would 
deliberately want to work those routes even though they knew that it was not their 
association that was permitted to work such routes. The timeframe to obtain a permit that 
allowed the driver to operate the routes took a long period of time for the owner to receive 
it. Therefore, operators were almost encouraged to operate illegally.  
The study reveals that contestation of power made the leaders lose focus on the role that 
they were supposed to play of leading and giving guidance to the members of the 
association but other leaders resorted by being part of the taxi violence than the solution. 
The study shows that taxi industry was mostly owned by layman people who were illiterate 
in formal business management and believed that problems are resolved by force or 
violence. 
• Objective 2: To investigate and describe the nature of taxi violence in Stanger. 
The findings of this study have shown that the taxi violence crime scenes are easily 
contaminated by uncooperative taxi owners and the crowd in the taxi rank. During fighting 
commuters become the victims because they got injured or killed in the process. Different 
weapons like gun, panga, knives, stones etc. were used in the commission of this violence. 
97 
 
The findings of the study reveal the difficulties in investigation of taxi violence whereby 
witnesses become reluctant to give information to the police as they fear for their lives. 
Nobody wants to be associated with taxi violence. 
• Objective 3: To understand the impact taxi violence had in Stanger 
The study shows that during such violence not only commuters were affected as they were 
not able to go to work. Children’ learning and education was interrupted and general peace 
in the community was negatively impacted on.   
Commuters were the ones who were mostly affected when taxi violence erupted, as taxi 
owners may decide to suspend operation of taxis. Indeed this affected commuters because 
they relied on taxis or public transport to any destination that they desired but in general 
taxi violence also brought fear and anxiety to commuters and the community at large as 
they would be killed deliberately or in the line of cross fire during taxi violence.  
The study reveals that taxi violence had a negative impact on the families of the taxi owners 
because they became victims of the violence. School children were unable to go to school 
because of transport and their parents were prevented to take them to school, as they would 
be regarded as operating on the routes if their private vehicle had five people.  
• Objective 4: To explore strategies used currently to deal with taxi violence in Stanger. 
The findings of the study show that reactive policing methods were used by all law 
enforcement agencies to police taxi violence in Stanger. Taxis operating without valid 
permits were impounded and the names list of passengers were made including the amount 
paid in order to be used as evidence in a court of law.   
The study reveals that law enforcement agencies in some instances had joint operations 
whereby each discipline focused on its specialties. Public Law Enforcement Unit (PTEU) 
specialised on permits, checking that all taxis operating on such routes had operating 
licenses to operate.  Illegal operators found were arrested together with taxi owners and 
their taxis were impounded. PTEU used its in-house intelligence to gather information and 
this decreased taxi violence in Stanger area. 
One strategy that the MEC of Transport Mr Willies Mchunu would use when there was taxi 
violence and taxi owners did not want to co-operate would be to close off the taxi rank, 
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which would automatically force taxi owners to go back to negotiations as there would be 
no source of income for them.  
The findings of the study reveal that in joint operations South African Police Service 
commanders took command and control of the operations. The duties performed by SAPS 
were to cordon and search operations in the taxi rank, roadblocks in the routes, visibility in 
the area by doing patrols, stop and search.  The study shows that when the complaint had 
been received the backup was sought in law enforcement agencies. Scenes of crime were 
attended and proper investigations were conducted. Evidence collected at the scene of 
crime assisted in following the lead of identifying the suspects involved in the commission 
of crime. 
The study indicated that in most of the operations local police officers were not involved.  
A destructive approach was used to surprise the suspects by the operational commander 
without disclosing the full information of the operation in order to find suspects unaware. 
Informers were hard to recruit but some of information was gathered from the taxi 
operators, which assisted in the execution of duties.  
Public Order Police (POP) was the one entrusted of executing crowd management duties 
because they were trained and had relevant equipment in dealing with crowd management.  
Operation Hlokomela by Santaco was another tool used to curb taxi violence whereby taxi 
associations together with law enforcement agency worked jointly. 
The finding of the study shows that interventions by the MEC of Transport Mr Mchunu 
yielded good but temporary results because after few months taxi violence would start 
again. The same applies to other joint operations that took place; they brought about only 
temporary solution to this problem. 
• Objective 5: To identify the challenges faced by the police in policing taxi violence 
The findings of the study show that there was shortage of human resources, which was a 
challenge when posting members to go and execute duties. There were no suitable physical 
resources to be used in policing taxi violence amongst the others. They used soft top 
vehicles which were not favourable for the situation. Only Public Order Police had relevant 
resources because they were specialising in crowd management.  
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The study reveals that many cases were closed undetected or thrown out of court because of 
insufficient evidence and no one wanted to give sworn statement and to go testify in the 
court of law because they might be killed, witnesses also did not trust police. It was alleged 
that some of police members were related to taxi owners in different relationships which 
had a high possibility of leaking information to the outsiders and that would pose danger 
them. It was risky for the local police to attend the taxi violence within their area. Security 
guards armed with big rifles posed danger to the community and the police because when 
the taxi violence erupted there would be firing crossing between both security guards and 
innocent people would be injured. 
 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following factors are proposed measures that could be used to deal effectively with taxi 
violence within Stanger area, namely:  
 
• Regulation of the taxi association by SANTACO: SANTACO needs to monitor the 
application of its rules, which guide the operations of the taxi industry within the 
association. The rules must be clearly outlined as to how many taxis should one person be 
entitled to have. ‘Fronting’ has to be discouraged because it does not empower people but 
adds to the problem. The committee must verify that taxi owners indeed are the lawful 
owners of taxi assisted by the DOT; and that would eliminate ‘fronting’. The exact amount 
of money for subscriptions must be known to all the owners and receipt of payment to be 
issues when payments are made. The money that would be paid to the association would be 
regulated and accounted for by tabling the financial report in the relevant meetings. 
 
• Electronic card system for passengers to be introduced. The passenger would buy the 
prepaid card and swipe it when using a taxi instead of cash. With this system the owner 
would not rely on the driver to know how much had been made for a day. This would 
reduce violence because all members of the association would respect the rules and there 
would be no exchange of money between the taxi driver and the taxi owner. 
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• Regulations by the DOT to be implemented accordingly in order to avoid conflict. 
Disciplinary processes to be taken against the officials who were found breaking the law. 
This should cover also how taxi owners should control/account for rank fees, verification of 
taxi ownership to avoid ukuteta/fronting. 
 
 
• Regulation of the conduct of the private security guards within the taxi industry 
There is nothing wrong with the security guards helping in taxi ranks but how they conduct 
themselves should be regulated and monitored by Private Security Industry Regulatory 
Authority (Psira). The security guards who are recklessly carrying firearms anyhow in 
public should be prosecuted. 
 
• Strengthen the use of informers, recruitment of informers to be an ongoing exercise by the 
police, which would enable them to have a pool of informers around the area. So if there is 
a crime to take place that information would be given to the police as soon as possible and 
that could assist the police to come up with a strategy to prevent crime from being 
committed. Anonymous crime reporting lines should be drawn up and the community to be 
sensitised to make use of the anonymous crime reporting lines if they suspect an incident or 
have witnessed one. Some of the people would want to remain unknown but they must be 
encouraged to report to the police any criminal activities. 
 
Many crimes go unresolved due to limited evidence because witnesses are afraid to give 
evidence to the police as they fear for their lives. Some police officers are alleged to have 
relations with the people in the taxi industry so it is difficult to become a witness because 
there is no trust between the community and the police. For giving information to the police 
or testifying in the court, the witness would be known and could up being killed. People 
could witness the incident but when enquiries were made by the police they would say that 
they do not know.  Place witnesses under witness protection so that they would be able to 
testify in court of law; which is also a challenge because when the case has been finalised 
the witness needs to go back to the community. The witness’s life is not guaranteed because 
the perpetrator had been sentenced and the people in the taxi industry worked in groups, so 
the remaining ones might take revenge against the witness.  
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• Clear demarcation of taxi routes 
The authority board should make a clear distinction of the rightful taxi association to be 
given an authority to use a particular route. That information/ rules should be circulated for 
comments by the taxi members so that the people disputing it can come forward before the 
final decision is made. This would prevent issuing the same route permits to different 
associations. 
 
• Decentralisation of route permit offices 
There should be quicker timeframes to obtain route permits. The authority board should 
decentralise its duties by opening offices in all four regions (as per DOT demarcation in 
KwaZulu-Natal) for taking service delivery to the people. This would fast track the 
processing of application forms for permits and would drastically reduce the waiting period. 
The DOT should put strict measures in place to penalise those taxi operators who would 
operate illegally on the routes that are not designated for them and a heavy sanction to be 
imposed on culprits. The DoT should also allow the use of temporary permits in case a 
person is waiting for a formal permit. This would reduce the element of jealousy in this 
industry and the frustrations endured while waiting. 
 
• Enhance partnership policing 
 
The local police should partner with the traffic officials, the private security personnel and 
the police from other police stations. The traffic officials would assist in verifying taxi 
permits, while the private security companies would assist to secure the crime scene until 
the police came and then strengthened themselves by using police from other stations. seem 
Such a situation seems to be working well within Stanger. For renting of the taxi rank the 
municipality to negotiate with Boxer Store in taking over the rank, so that the municipality 
would be the one responsible for collection of the rank fees. Municipality to provide 
security and that would solve the issue of ibhakede (the money that is paid by the taxi 
drivers when leaving the rank) and private security guards. The rank fee would be paid to 
the association, the only money that the association would be responsible of would be the 
association subscription fee which could be accounted for. 
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SAPS need to liaise with the DOT in order to train or provide workshops to local police 
officers on regulations of taxis so that it would be easy for them to enforce the law because 
policing of taxi violence differs from any other policing. Police needed to understand the 
operations of the taxi industry, routes and permits, be able to check on who were the 
associations having the authority to those routes or not.  That would assist in empowering 
local police and traffic police and enable them to include such practice on their daily 
routine work. 
Crime intelligence should gather information that would enable police to be proactive and 
put measures in place in preventing taxi violence or be prepared if violence erupts. Crime 
intelligence should continuously and closely monitor the taxi industry by being informed of 
their tactics and strategies and building good informers within the taxi industry itself. 
Police officers are entrusted with many duties and the number of population within Stanger 
has increased, which has resulted in the shortage of manpower. It is recommended that 
more police officers to be employed for effective service delivery. Constant policing is 
crucial because it is a determining factor to prevent taxi violence. Focus crime prevention to 
operate 24/7 in order to show visibility at all times and be able to detect and defuse 
suspicious acts, perform patrol duties, stop and search. Police need to identify hot-sport 
areas and be more vigilant in such. Constantly do surprise visits and searches that might 
assist in curbing taxi violence, as the people in the taxi industry would never know when 
the police are coming and they would be afraid to plan evil acts. 
Police officers need to build good working relations with the taxi association by constant 
visits to taxi associations as well (Stanger and Maphumulo taxi association) in order find 
out their problems, hear their proposed views on how such problems can be resolved and 
put mitigation factors in place. The environment would encourage both associations to 
interact and engage in working together to find the best solution to the problem and that 
would proactively eliminate violence.  
The DOT as the custodian of the law and issuing operating licenses (permits) need to have 
relations with taxi associations (Stanger and Maphumulo taxi association) at the regional 
level in order to advise address challenges. 
Law enforcement agencies in some other instances needed to do joint trainings in order to 
understand their shared roles and responsibilities and to exchange their experiences in taxi 
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violence. Public Transport Enforcement Unit to educate other agencies about permits, 
routes etc. as they are specialists in this field. The more the involvement of the stakeholders 
in taxi violence matters the more the manpower and the resources to help the police to deal 
effectively with this violence. 
  
• Corruption within the taxi industry 
Corruption from police who own taxis and government officials selling route permits. The 
study recommends that an internal investigation be made with an aim to root out all those 
police officers who are involved in the taxi industry, so that it would be effective to deal 
with taxi-related crimes, because having such police officers within gave an impression that 
the local police officers were useless and not doing anything. Government must have a 
stricter rule for the people working in the law enforcement not to be allowed to have taxis 
or to be in the taxi business, because that compromised the effective work of the police.   
Rotation or restructuring of local police members would give a fresh start to the functioning 
of the station. Disciplinary action should be taken against government officials who are 
selling the routes. If these officials are found guilty they should be punished according to 
the law of this country. 
  
5.3 CONCLUSION 
 
Without fear of any contradiction taxi violence is due to various factors, tangible and 
intangibles. Over tangibles, are dispute over ranking facilities, routes and commuters. 
“Intangibles” are behaviours that are there in society and eventually manifest themselves in the 
industry through greediness, bullies and victimisation. The enabling environments for all these 
things to thrive are a lack of proper administration, both by the industry itself and the 
government as proper regulator. The industry has just been generally characterised by a broad 
community that is conducted by illiterate people and people with a lack of proper education and 
proper administration. On the other side all this happens when government and law 
enforcement have no direct laws to be used by police, no knowledge of administration of 
routes, and no standard regulations in the issuing of permits. The government has taken a long 
times to make the relevant laws.  
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The entire business fraternity generally has accepted that the taxi industry is a sensitive 
business to participate in and is part of black-on-black violence. The industry emanated during 
apartheid and by default started by the black race, who were the victims of the system and who 
were given the last preferences by the then government for the work they did. 
 
When one checks its nature, taxi violence has proven to be a sporadic phenomenon and 
happens everywhere there are taxis.  It thus renders a challenge to police because it happens 
like any other form of crime but there is no grand plan on how to do with it. There are no 
specifications in place on how to detect and police taxi violence. Whereas the democratic 
elected government wishes to deal with this inherited monster, government intervention is seen 
as interference and involvement by government officials together with the police in the taxi 
industry is conducted with great suspicion and mistrust that makes it difficult to police the taxi 
industry effectively and this poses a danger to police, taxi industry and the community at large. 
 
The regulation and deregulation of the taxi industry by the government is also met with great   
mistrust from the side of the taxi owners and operators, which further creates the uncertainty 
about the future and solutions to challenges facing the industry. Despite the challenges facing 
both government and the industry, monitoring tools need to be put in place to check whether 
taxi associations abide by the rules or not and those who failsshould be harshly penalised. This 
would assist in making sure that there is no poaching and the association is using the routes that 
are allocated to them. The security guards that are utilised by the taxi association end up 
becoming the instigators of crime by making sure that they perpetuate crime when their term of 
office lapses so that their contract can be renewed.  
 
The taking over of the ranks by municipalities with their own security would minimise private 
security on guarding the associations and the monies that are paid by the association would be 
paid to the municipality and be accounted for. Training of police is also a factor to be 
considered closely when one attempts to stop taxi violence, as currently one can conclude that 
if the new members and the old members do not have a plan to deal with taxi violence in place, 
the frightened new staff could lead to demoralisation. Lack of a strategy and a plan for old 
members can bring complaisance and a lack of attempts to deal with situation. The sense of 
vulnerability can be seen as exposure to a lack of skills from the junior members, eventually 
bringing lack of trust. 
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Taxi-related regulation is non-negotiable. If the government was to stop this violence, good 
training would be given to the police to equip them in dealing with taxi related issues; 
including the dictation elements of crime before it can take place and to apply preventative 
measures thereof. Taxi violence is a challenge, as it is sporadic with not enough manpower 
from the police to be in all places at once. The sense of vulnerability can be seen as exposure to 
a lack of skills from the junior members, which could eventually bring a lack of trust.  
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ADDENDUM A 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER  
TOPIC: THE POLICING OF TAXI VIOLENCE IN STANGER  
 
AIM:  How should the taxi violence is policed in Stanger? 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
• What strategies do the police use in policing taxi violence in Stanger? 
• What are the challenges of policing taxi violence in Stanger? 
• What is the nature of the relationship between the police and the taxi industry? 
• How should taxi violence be policed in Stanger? 
 
You are kindly requested to answer the following questions in this interview schedule, for 
the researcher. The questions, responses and the results will be revealed. 
 
Privacy will be maintained throughout the study, the researcher will ensure that participants 
are treated equally regardless of their socio-economic status. The information given will be 
treated with confidentiality and no other person will have access to interview data. The 
researcher will ensure that participants are treated equally regardless of their socio-
economic status whether illiterate or learned and privacy will be maintained throughout the 
study. The participants to the research will remain unanimous. The information you provide 
will be used only in a research project for a Master of Technology degree registered with 
the Programme Group: Police Practice at the University of South Africa. The analysed and 
processed data will be published in a research report. 
 
Your answers will be noted by the interviewer himself, on paper and by Dictaphone. 
Should any question be unclear, please ask the researcher for clarification. Only one answer 
per question is required. When answering the questions, it is very important to give your 
own opinion. 
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Written permission has been obtained from the South African Police Service in advance, 
for the interview to be conducted. 
 
PARTICIPANT 
I hereby give permission to be interviewed and that information supplied by me can be used 
in this research. 
 
YES / NO 
 
SECTION A:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
• Where are you working? 
  
 
 
 
• How long have you been in a place of employment? 
 
1 – 5 yrs. 5yrs – 10 yrs. 10yrs and above 
 
 
• Do you currently police taxi violence?  
 
YES NO 
 
• For how many years have you been involved taxi violence related issues? 
 
 
 
 
• What is your highest qualification? 
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• Did you undergo any training on policing taxi violence?  
 
YES NO 
 
 
SECTION B: WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF TAXI VIOLENCE IN STANGER? 
 
1. In your opinion what is your understanding of taxi violence? 
 
 
 
2. To your understanding who are the people/parties involved in the taxi violence in Stanger? 
 
 
 
3. To your understanding what are the causes of taxi violence within Stanger? 
 
 
 
4. To your understanding what is the nature of taxi violence within Stanger? (manner in which 
it occurs from the beginning to the end) 
 
 
 
5. In your opinion who are the people who are affected by taxi violence in Stanger?  
 
 
 
6. According to your opinion, what are the impacts of taxi violence in the economy of 
Stanger?  
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7. How does the taxi violence in Stanger affect the social relations among the community 
members and/or between the community members and the members of the taxi industry? 
 
 
 
8. What, according to your opinion, are the effects of taxi violence politically in Stanger?  
 
 
 
SECTION C: HOW IS TAXI VIOLENCE POLICED IN STANGER? 
 
1. Which strategies do the SAPS follows to police taxi violence in Stanger?  
 
 
 
2. Which stakeholders are involved in resolving taxi violence in Stanger and what is their 
involvement like? 
 
 
 
3. Do multilateral and bilateral meetings with parties involved (taxi associations) yield any 
good results? 
 
 
 
4. Is the role (strategy) of the police effective in trying to combat taxi violence in Stanger? 
Motivate your answer 
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5. Are the members of the society cooperative in giving information to the police? 
 
 
 
6. What are the joint strategies to combat taxi violence and who is heading operations? 
 
 
 
 
SECTION D: WHAT I S THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
POLICE AND THE TAXI INDUSTRY? 
 
1.  How can the working relationship between the police and the taxi industry be best 
described? 
 
 
 
2. Is there a good relationship between the police and the taxi industry or not? Motivate 
your answer 
 
 
 
SECTION E: WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES OF POLICING TAXI VIOLENCE 
IN STANGER? 
 
1. What are the challenges faced by the police in policing taxi violence?  
 
 
 
2. Do you think there is a good working relationship amongst all partners regarding taxi 
violence? Why do you say so? 
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3. Do police enjoy support in dealing with taxi violence? 
 
 
 
SECTION F: WHAT PROACTIVE MEASURES COULD POLICE HAVE TAKEN 
IN POLICING TAXI VIOLENCE IN STANGER? 
 
1. What factors do you think can be taken into consideration to stop taxi violence? 
 
 
 
2. What will be the role of police in fighting taxi violence? 
 
 
 
3. In your opinion how can taxi violence be best policed? 
 
 
 
SECTION G: HOW SHOULD TAXI VIOLENCE BE POLICED IN STANGER? 
 
1. What do you think would be the best way to police taxi violence?  
 
 
 
2. What are the other alternative methods that could be used to eliminate taxi violence? 
 
 
 
3. Do you think taxi violence is a provincial or national problem 
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ADDENDUM B: TAXI VIOLENCE CRIME SCENE 
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